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Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

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FINAL REPORT

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Air

# **Economic Impact Analysis of Final Coke Ovens NESHAP**

## **Final Report**



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Economic Impact Analysis of  
the Final Coke Ovens NESHAP

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## SECTION 1

### INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has developed a maximum achievable control technology (MACT) standard to reduce hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) from the coke ovens: pushing, quenching, and battery stacks source category. To support this rulemaking, EPA's Innovative Strategies and Economics Group (ISEG) has conducted an economic impact analysis (EIA) to assess the potential costs of the rule. This report documents the methods and results of this EIA. These final standards will implement Section 112(d) of the Clean Air Act (CAA) by requiring all major sources to meet HAP emission standards reflecting the application of the MACT. The HAPs emitted by this source category include coke oven emissions, polycyclic organic matter, and volatile organic compounds such as benzene and toluene.

#### 1.1 Agency Requirements for an EIA

Congress and the Executive Office have imposed statutory and administrative requirements for conducting economic analyses to accompany regulatory actions. Section 317 of the CAA specifically requires estimation of the cost and economic impacts for specific regulations and standards proposed under the authority of the Act.<sup>1</sup> ISEG's *Economic Analysis Resource Document* provides detailed guidelines and expectations for economic analyses that support MACT rulemaking (EPA, 1999). In the case of the coke MACT, these requirements are fulfilled by examining the following:

- facility-level impacts (e.g., changes in output rates, profitability, and facility closures),

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<sup>1</sup>In addition, Executive Order (EO) 12866 requires a more comprehensive analysis of benefits and costs for proposed *significant* regulatory actions. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance under EO 12866 stipulates that a full benefit-cost analysis is required only when the regulatory action has an annual effect on the economy of \$100 million or more. Other statutory and administrative requirements include examination of the composition and distribution of benefits and costs. For example, the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement and Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), requires EPA to consider the economic impacts of regulatory actions on small entities.

- market-level impacts (e.g., changes in market prices, domestic production, and imports),
- industry-level impacts (e.g., changes in revenue, costs, and employment), and
- societal-level impacts (e.g., estimates of the consumer burden as a result of higher prices and reduced consumption levels and changes in domestic and foreign profitability).


## **1.2 Overview of Coke, Iron and Steel, and Foundry Industries**

In the United States, furnace and foundry coke are produced by two producing sectors—integrated producers and merchant producers. Integrated producers are part of integrated iron and steel mills and primarily produce furnace coke for captive use in blast furnaces. In 2000, integrated producers accounted for approximately three-fourths of U.S. coke capacity, and merchant producers accounted for the remaining one-fourth. Merchant producers sell furnace and foundry coke on the open market to integrated steel producers (i.e., furnace coke) and iron foundries (i.e., foundry coke). Some merchant producers sell both furnace and foundry coke, while others specialize in only one.

Figure 1-1 summarizes the interactions between source categories and markets within the broader iron and steel industry. As shown, captive coke plants are colocated at integrated iron and steel mills providing furnace coke for its blast furnaces, while merchant coke plants supply the remaining demand for furnace coke at integrated iron and steel mills and supply the entire demand for foundry coke at iron foundries. These integrated mills compete with nonintegrated mills (i.e., minimills) and foreign imports in the markets for these steel products typically consumed by the automotive, construction, and other durable goods producers. Alternatively, iron foundries use foundry coke, pig iron, and scrap in their ironmaking furnaces (cupolas) to produce iron castings, and steel foundries use pig iron and scrap in their steelmaking furnaces (electric arc and electric induction) to produce steel castings. The markets for iron and steel castings are distinct with different product characteristics and end users.

The EIA models the specific links between these models. The analysis to support the coke EIA focuses on four specific markets:

- furnace coke,
- foundry coke,



**Figure 1-1. Summary of Interactions Between Producers and Commodities in the Iron and Steel Industry**

- steel mill products, and
- iron castings.

Changes in price and quantity in these markets are used to estimate the facility, market, industry, and social impacts of the coke regulation.

### 1.3 Summary of EIA Results

The rule requires coke manufacturers to implement good management practices and ongoing maintenance that will increase the costs of producing furnace and foundry coke at affected facilities. The increased production costs will lead to economic impacts in the form of increases in market prices and decreases in domestic furnace coke production. The impacts of these price increases will be borne by integrated producers of steel mill products as well as consumers of steel mill products. Nonintegrated steel mills and foreign producers of furnace coke will earn higher profits. Key results of the EIA for the coke MACT are as follows:

- *Engineering Costs:* The engineering analysis estimates annual costs for existing sources of \$20.2 million.<sup>2</sup>
- *Sales Test:* A simple “sales test,” in which the annualized compliance costs are computed as a share of sales for affected companies that own coke batteries, shows that thirteen of the fourteen companies are affected by less than 3 percent of sales. The cost-to-sales ratio (CSR) for the median company is 0.13 percent.
- *Price and Quantity Impacts:* The EIA model predicts the following:
  - The market price for furnace coke is projected to increase by 2.7 percent (\$3.00/short ton), and domestic furnace coke production is projected to decrease by 3.9 percent (348,000 tons/year).
  - The market price and domestic foundry coke production for foundry coke are projected to remain unchanged.
  - The market price for steel mill products is projected to increase by 0.03 percent (\$0.14/short ton), and domestic production of steel mill products is projected to decrease by 0.18 percent (192,000 tons/year).
  - The market price and production for iron castings are projected to remain unchanged.

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<sup>2</sup>All costs were adjusted to \$2000 dollars (base year of the economic analysis).

- *Plant Closures:* Two furnace coke batteries are projected to close.
- *Small Businesses:* The Agency identified three small companies that own and operate coke batteries, or 21 percent of the total. The average CSR for these firms is 2.0 percent. One small business is projected to have a CSR between 1 and 3 percent. One small business is projected to have a CSR greater than 3 percent. No facilities or batteries owned by a small business are projected to close as a result of the regulation.
- *Social Costs:* The annual social costs are projected to be \$18.6 million.
  - The consumer burden as a result of higher prices and reduced consumption levels is \$20.9 million annually.
  - The aggregate producer profit gain is expected to increase by \$2.3 million.
    - ✓ The profit losses are \$10.3 million annually for domestic producers.
    - ✓ Foreign producer profits increase by \$12.6 million due to higher prices and level of impacts.

#### **1.4 Organization of this Report**

The remainder of this report supports and details the methodology and the results of the EIA of the coke MACT.

- Section 2 presents a profile of the coke industry.
- Section 3 describes the regulatory controls and presents engineering cost estimates for the regulation.
- Section 4 reports market-, industry-, and societal-level impacts.
- Section 5 contains the small business screening analysis.
- Appendix A describes the EIA methodology.
- Appendix B describes the development of the coke battery cost functions.
- Appendixes C and D include the econometric estimation of the demand elasticity for steel mill products and iron castings.
- Appendix E reports the results of the joint economic impacts of the Iron and Steel and Coke MACTs.
- Appendix F reports the results of foreign coke import elasticity sensitivity analysis.

## **SECTION 2**

### **INDUSTRY PROFILE**

Coke is metallurgical coal that has been baked into a charcoal-like substance that burns more evenly and has more structural strength than coal. Coke manufacture is included under Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code 3312—Blast Furnaces and Steel Mills; however, coke production is a small fraction of this industry. In 2000, the U.S. produced 20.8 million short tons of coke. Coke is primarily used as an input for producing steel in blast furnaces at integrated iron and steel mills (i.e., furnace coke) and as an input for gray, ductile, and malleable iron castings in cupolas at iron foundries (i.e., foundry coke). Therefore, the demand for coke is a derived demand that is largely dependent on production of steel from blast furnaces and iron castings.

In the remainder of this section, we provide a summary profile of the coke industry in the United States, including the technical and economic aspects of the industry that must be addressed in the economic impact analysis. Section 2.1 provides an overview of the production processes and the resulting types of coke. Section 2.2 summarizes the organization of the U.S. coke industry, including a description of U.S. manufacturing plants and batteries, the companies that own these plants, and the markets for coke products. Finally, Section 2.3 presents historical data on the coke industry, including U.S. production and consumption and foreign trade.

#### **2.1 Production Overview**

This section provides an overview of the by-product coke manufacturing process and types of coke produced in the United States. Although not discussed in this section, several substitute technologies for by-product cokemaking have been developed in the United States and abroad, including nonrecovery cokemaking, formcoke, and jumbo coking ovens. Of these alternatives to by-product coke batteries, the nonrecovery method is the only substitute in terms of current market share in the United States.

### ***2.1.1 By-Product Coke Production Process***


Cokemaking involves heating coal in the absence of air resulting in the separation of the non-carbon elements of the coal from the product (i.e., coke). The process essentially bakes the coal into a charcoal-like substance for use as fuel in blast furnaces at integrated iron and steel mills and cupolas at iron foundries. Figure 2-1 summarizes the multi-step production process for by-product cokemaking, which includes the following steps:

- coal preparation and charging,
- coking and pushing,
- quenching, and
- by-product recovery.

In by-product cokemaking, coal is converted to coke in long, narrow by-product coke ovens that are constructed in groups with common side walls, called batteries (typically consisting of 10 to 100 coke ovens).

Figure 2-2 provides a schematic of a by-product coke battery. Metallurgical coal is pulverized and fed into the oven (or charged) through ports at the top of the oven, which are then covered with lids. The coal undergoes destructive distillation in the oven at 1,650°F to 2,000°F for 15 to 30 hours. A slight positive back-pressure maintained on the oven prevents air from entering the oven during the coking process. After coking, the incandescent or “hot” coke is then pushed from the coke oven into a special railroad car and transported to a quench tower at the end of the battery where it is cooled with water and screened to a uniform size. During this process, raw coke oven gas is removed through an offtake system, by-products such as benzene, toluene, and xylene are recovered, and the cleaned gas is used to underfire the coke ovens and for fuel elsewhere in the plant.

As shown in Table 2-1, pollutants may be emitted into the atmosphere from several sources during by-product cokemaking. For the final MACT standards, the sources of environmental concern to EPA are the pushing of coke from the ovens, the quenching of incandescent coke, and battery stacks. Coke pushing results in fugitive particulate emissions, which may include volatile organic compounds (VOCs), while coke quenching results in particulate emissions with traces of organic compounds. EPA will focus on these three areas of emissions as HAP-emitting source categories to be regulated.




**Figure 2-1. The By-Product Coke Production Process**

### **2.1.2 Types of Coke**

The particular mix of high- and low-volatile coals used and the length of time the coal is heated (i.e., coking time) determine the type of coke produced: (1) furnace coke, which is used in blast furnaces as part of the traditional steelmaking process, or (2) foundry coke, which is used in the cupolas of foundries in making gray, ductile, or malleable iron castings. Furnace coke is produced by baking a coal mix of 10 to 30 percent low-volatile coal for 16 to 18 hours at oven temperatures of 2,200°F. Most blast furnace operators prefer coke sized between 0.75 inches and 3 inches. Alternatively, foundry coke is produced by baking a mix of 50 percent or more low-volatile coal for 27 to 30 hours at oven temperatures of 1,800°F. Coke size requirements in foundry cupolas are a function of the cupola diameter (usually based on a 10:1 ratio of cupola diameter to coke size) with foundry coke ranging in





**Figure 2-2. A Schematic of a By-Product Coke Battery**

Source: U.S. International Trade Commission. 1994. *Metallurgical Coke: Baseline Analysis of the U.S. Industry and Imports*. Publication No. 2745. Washington, DC: U.S. International Trade Commission.

**Table 2-1. Air Emissions from U.S. Coke Manufacturing Plants by Emission Point**

Emission Point	Example Pollutants
Oven charging and leaks from doors, lids, and offtakes <sup>a</sup>	Polycyclic organic matter (e.g., benzo(a)pyrene and many others), volatile organic compounds (e.g., benzene, toluene), and particulate matter
Coke pushing, coke quenching, and battery stacks (oven underfiring) <sup>b</sup>	
By-product recovery plant <sup>c</sup>	Benzene, toluene, zylene, napthalene, and other volatile organic compounds


<sup>a</sup> A NESHAP was promulgated for these emission points in 1993—see 40 CFR Part 63, Subpart L.

<sup>b</sup> The final MACT standard evaluated in this economic analysis will address hazardous pollutants from these emission points and is scheduled for promulgation in 2001 in 40 CFR Part 63, Subpart CCCCC.

<sup>c</sup> A NESHAP for the by-product recovery plant was promulgated in 1989 in 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart L.

size from 4 inches to 9 inches (Lankford et al., 1985). Because the longer coking times and lower temperatures required for foundry coke are more favorable for long-term production, foundry coke batteries typically remain in acceptable working condition longer than furnace coke batteries (Hogan and Koelble, 1996).

As shown in Figure 2-3, furnace coke accounts for the vast majority of coke produced in the United States. In 2000, furnace coke production was roughly 17.7 million short tons, or 85 percent of total U.S. coke production, while foundry coke production was only 1.3 million short tons. Integrated iron and steel producers that use furnace coke in their blast furnaces may either produce this coke on-site (i.e., captive coke producers) or purchase it on the market from merchant coke producers. As shown in Table 2-2, almost 76 percent of U.S. furnace coke capacity in 1997 was from captive operations at integrated steel producers. Alternatively, there are no captive coke operations at U.S. iron foundries so these producers purchase all foundry coke on the market from merchant coke producers. In summary, captive coke production occurs at large integrated iron and steel mills and accounts for the vast majority of domestic furnace coke production, while merchant coke production occurs at smaller merchant plants and accounts for a small share of furnace coke production and all of the foundry coke produced in the United States.



**Figure 2-3. Distribution of U.S. Coke Production by Type: 2000**

**Table 2-2. Summary Data for Coke Manufacturing Plants: 1997**

Plant Name	Location	Number of Batteries	Number of Coke Ovens	Total Coke Capacity (short tons/yr)	Coke Production by Type (short tons/yr)				
					Furnace	Foundry	Other	Total	
Integrated Producers									
Acme Steel <sup>a</sup>	Chicago, IL	2	100	500,000	493,552	0	19,988	513,538	
AK Steel	Ashland, KY	2	146	1,000,000	942,986	0	0	942,986	
AK Steel	Middletown, OH	1	76	429,901	410,000	0	0	410,000	
Bethlehem Steel	Burns Harbor, IN	2	164	1,877,000	1,672,701	0	82,848	1,755,549	
Bethlehem Steel <sup>a</sup>	Lackawanna, NY	2	152	750,000	747,686	0	0	747,686	
Geneva Steel <sup>a</sup>	Provo, UT	4	252	800,000	700,002	0	16,320	716,322	
Gulf States Steel <sup>a</sup>	Gadsden, AL	2	130	500,000	521,000	0	0	521,000	
LTV Steel <sup>a</sup>	Chicago, IL	1	60	615,000	590,250	0	0	590,250	
LTV Steel	Warren, OH	1	85	549,000	543,156	0	0	543,156	
National Steel	Ecorse, MI	1	85	924,839	908,733	0	0	908,733	
National Steel	Granite City, IL	2	90	601,862	570,654	0	0	570,654	
U.S. Steel	Clairton, PA	12	816	5,573,185	4,854,111	0	0	4,854,111	
U.S. Steel	Gary, IN	4	268	2,249,860	1,813,483	0	0	1,813,483	
Wheeling-Pittsburgh	Follansbee, WV	4	224	1,247,000	1,249,501	0	36,247	1,285,748	
Total, Integrated Producers									16,173,216

(continued)

**Table 2-2. Summary Data for Coke Manufacturing Plants: 1997 (Continued)**

Plant Name	Location	Number of Batteries	Number of Coke Ovens	Total Coke Capacity (short tons/yr)	Coke Production by Type (short tons/yr)			
					Furnace	Foundry	Other	Total
Merchant Producers								
ABC Coke	Tarrant, AL	3	132	699,967	25,806	727,720	0	753,526
Citizens Gas	Indianapolis, IN	3	160	634,931	173,470	367,798	93,936	635,204
Empire Coke	Holt, AL	2	60	162,039	0	142,872	0	142,872
Erie Coke	Erie, PA	2	58	214,951	0	122,139	19,013	141,152
Indiana Harbor Coke <sup>b,c</sup>	East Chicago, IN	4	268	1,300,000	0	0	0	0
Jewell Coke and Coal <sup>b</sup>	Vansant, VA	4	142	649,000	649,000	0	0	649,000
Koppers	Monessen, PA	2	56	372,581	358,105	0	0	358,105
New Boston Coke <sup>a</sup>	Portsmouth, OH	1	70	346,126	317,777	0	4,692	322,469
Shenango, Inc.	Pittsburgh, PA	1	56	514,779	354,137	0	0	354,137
Sloss Industries	Birmingham, AL	3	120	451,948	268,304	131,270	33,500	433,074
Tonawanda	Buffalo, NY	1	60	268,964	0	136,225	63,822	200,047
Total, Merchant Producers								
		26	1,182	5,615,286	2,146,599	1,628,024	214,963	3,989,586
Total, All Producers								
		66	3,830	23,232,933	18,164,414	1,628,024	370,366	20,162,802

<sup>a</sup> Closed since 1997.

<sup>b</sup> Operates nonrecovery coke batteries not subject to the regulations.

<sup>c</sup> Newly built coke operations coming on-line during 1998.

Sources: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1998. *Coke Industry Responses to Information Collection Request (ICR) Survey*. Database prepared for EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. Research Triangle Park, NC.  
 Association of Iron and Steel Engineers (AISE). 1998. "1998 Directory of Iron and Steel Plants: Volume 1 Plants and Facilities." Pittsburgh, PA: AISE.

Co-products of the by-product coke production process are (1) coke breeze, the fine screenings that result from the crushing of coke; and (2) “other coke,” the coke that does not meet size requirements of steel producers that is sold as a fuel source to non-steel producers. In addition, the by-product cokemaking process results in the recovery of some salable crude materials such as coke oven gas, ammonia liquor, tar, and light oil. The cleaned coke oven gas is used to underfire the coke ovens with excess gas used as fuel in other parts of the plant or sold. The remaining crude by-products may be further processed and separated into secondary products such as anhydrous ammonia, phenol, ortho cresol, and toluene. In the past, coke plants were a major source of these products (sometimes referred to as coal chemicals); however, today their output is overshadowed by chemicals produced from petroleum manufacturing (DOE, 1996).

## **2.2 Industry Organization**

In order to inform the economic impact analysis, we provide an overview of the U.S. coke industry based on survey data collected by the Agency for 1997. Note, however, six coke plants have closed since the survey was completed (see Table 2-2). We also have provided selected updated information that reflects current trends in the industry (i.e., company and market data).

### **2.2.1 *Manufacturing Plants***

Figure 2-4 identifies the location of U.S. coke manufacturing plants by type of producer (i.e., integrated and merchant). As of 1997 (see Table 2-2), there were 14 integrated plants operating 40 coke batteries with 2,648 coke ovens. Total coke capacity at these plants was 17.6 million short tons with production devoted entirely to furnace coke. Large integrated steel companies owned and operated these plants and accounted for 80 percent of total U.S. coke production in 1997 (all furnace coke). U.S. Steel was the largest integrated producer, operating two coke manufacturing plants in Clairton, Pennsylvania and Gary, Indiana. The Clairton facility was the largest single coke plant in the United States, accounting for roughly 24 percent of U.S. cokemaking capacity. Together, the two U.S. Steel plants accounted for roughly 40 percent of all coke batteries and ovens at integrated plants. As shown in Table 2-3, integrated coke plants had an average of 2.9 coke batteries, 189 coke ovens, and coke capacity of 1.26 million short tons per plant. These plants produced an average of 1.14 million short tons of furnace coke and accounted for 88 percent of the 18.2 million short tons of furnace coke produced in 1997.



**Figure 2-4. Location of Coke Manufacturing Plants by Type of Producer: 1997**

Source: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1998. *Coke Industry Responses to Information Collection Request (ICR) Survey*. Database prepared for EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. Research Triangle Park, NC.

As of 1997, there were 11 merchant plants operating 26 coke batteries with 1,182 coke ovens. Total coke capacity at these plants was 5.6 million short tons with production split between furnace and foundry coke. Merchant coke plants are typically owned by smaller, independent companies that rely solely on the sale of coke and coke by-products to generate revenue. These plants accounted for 20 percent of total U.S. coke production in 1997. Sun Coal and Coke is the largest merchant furnace producer, operating Jewell Coke and Coal in Vansant, Virginia and newly constructed operations at Indiana Harbor Coke in East Chicago, Illinois (both plants employ the nonrecovery cokemaking processes). Although listed as a merchant producer, the Indiana Harbor Coke plant is co-located with Inland Steel's integrated plant in East Chicago, Illinois and has an agreement to

**Table 2-3. Coke Industry Summary Data by Type of Producer: 1997**

Item	Integrated Producers		Merchant Producers		Total
	Total	Share	Total	Share	
Coke Plants (#)	14	56.0%	11	44.0%	25
Coke Batteries (#)					
Total number	40	60.6%	26	39.4%	66
Average per plant	2.86		2.36		2.64
Coke Ovens (#)					
Total number	2,648	69.1%	1,182	30.9%	3,830
Average per plant	189.1		107.5		153.2
Coke Capacity (short tons/yr)					
Total capacity	17,617,647	75.8%	5,615,286	24.2%	23,232,933
Average per plant	1,258,403		510,481		929,317
Coke Production (short tons/yr)					
Total production					
Furnace	16,017,815	88.2%	2,146,599	11.8%	18,164,414
Foundry	0	0.0%	1,628,024	100.0%	1,628,024
Other	155,403	42.0%	214,963	58.0%	370,366
Total	16,173,218	80.2%	3,989,586	19.8%	20,162,804
Average per Plant					
Furnace	1,144,130		195,145		726,577
Foundry	0		148,002		65,121
Other	11,100		19,542		14,815
Total	1,155,230		362,690		806,512

Sources: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 1998. *Coke Industry Responses to Information Collection Request (ICR) Survey*. Database prepared for EPA's Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards. Research Triangle Park, NC.

Association of Iron and Steel Engineers (AISE). 1998. "1998 Directory of Iron and Steel Plants: Volume 1 Plants and Facilities." Pittsburgh, PA: AISE.

supply 1.2 million short tons of coke to Inland and sell the residual furnace coke production (Ninneman, 1997). As shown in Table 2-3, merchant coke plants are smaller than integrated plants with an average of 2.4 coke batteries, 108 coke ovens, and coke capacity of only 0.5 million short tons per plant. In 1997, these plants produced an average of 195,000 short tons of furnace coke and 148,000 short tons of foundry coke per plant, accounting for 12 percent of U.S. furnace coke and 100 percent of foundry coke produced.

### **2.2.2 Companies**

The final MACT will potentially affect business entities that own coke manufacturing facilities. Facilities comprise a land site with plant and equipment that combine inputs (raw materials, energy, labor) to produce outputs (coke). Companies that own these facilities are legal business entities that have capacity to conduct business transactions and make business decisions that affect the facility. The terms facility, establishment, plant, and mill are synonymous in this analysis and refer to the physical location where products are manufactured. Likewise, the terms company and firm are synonymous and refer to the legal business entity that owns one or more facilities.

As shown in Table 2-4, 14 companies currently operate U.S. coke manufacturing coke batteries. These companies ranged from small, single-facility merchant coke producers to large integrated steel producers. As shown, integrated producers are large, publicly owned integrated steel companies such as USX Corporation and Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Alternatively, merchant producers are smaller, typically privately owned and operated companies including Koppers Industries, Drummond Company (which owns ABC Coke), McWane Incorporated (which owns Empire Coke), and Citizens Gas and Coke. These potentially affected parent companies range in size from 200 to over 50,000 employees.

Companies are grouped into small and large categories using Small Business Administration (SBA) general size standard definitions for North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes. Under these guidelines, SBA establishes 1,000 or fewer employees as the small business threshold for Iron and Steel Mills (i.e., NAICS 331111), while coke ovens not integrated with steel mills are classified under All Other Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing (i.e., NAICS 324199) with a threshold of 500. Figure 2-5 illustrates the distribution of affected U.S. companies by size based on reported employment data. As shown, three companies (all merchant producers), or 21 percent, are categorized as small, and 11 companies, or 79 percent, are categorized as large. As expected, the companies owning integrated coke plants are generally larger than the companies owning



**Table 2-4. Summary of Companies Owning Potentially Affected Coke Manufacturing Plants: 2000**

<b>Company Name</b>	<b>Legal Form of Organization</b>	<b>Producer Type</b>	<b>Total Sales (\$10<sup>6</sup>)</b>	<b>Total Employment</b>	<b>Small Business</b>
Bethlehem Steel Corporation	Public	Integrated	4,197	14,700	No
Citizens Gas and Coke	Private	Merchant	339	1,000	Yes
Drummond Company Inc. <sup>a</sup>	Private	Merchant	615	2,800	No
International Steel Group <sup>b</sup>	NA	Integrated	4,934	16,500	No
Koppers Industries Inc.	Private	Merchant	724	2,085	No
McWane Inc. <sup>c</sup>	Private	Merchant	755	5,170	No
NKK Corporation	NA Foreign	Integrated	14,148	39,875	No
Shenango Group <sup>d</sup>	Holding company	Merchant	49	200	Yes
Sunaco <sup>e</sup>	Public	Merchant	12,426	14,200	No
Tonawanda Coke Corporation <sup>f</sup>	NA	Merchant	47	260	Yes
USX Corporation	Public	Integrated	39,914	49,679	No
Walter Industries Inc. <sup>g</sup>	Public	Merchant	1,185	6,535	No
WHX Corporation <sup>h</sup>	Public	Integrated	1,745	6,991	No

<sup>a</sup> Owns ABC Coke.

<sup>b</sup> Owns LTV Corporation. Data presented is for LTV Corporation.

<sup>c</sup> Owns Empire Coke.

<sup>d</sup> Owns Shenango Inc.

<sup>e</sup> Owns Indiana Harbor Coke Company and Jewell Coke and Coal Company, which are not subject to final regulations.


<sup>f</sup> Owns Erie Coke Corporation.

<sup>g</sup> Owns Sloss Industries Corporation.

<sup>h</sup> Owns Wheeling-Pittsburgh Corporation.

Source: Hoover's Online and selected 10-K and Annual Reports.

merchant coke plants. None of the nine companies owning integrated operations have fewer than 1,000 employees or are classified as small businesses. Alternatively, three of the companies owning merchant operations have fewer than 1,000 employees and are classified as small businesses. However, not all companies owning merchant coke plants are small; for example, the Sun Company is one of the largest companies with over 10,000 employees.



**Figure 2-5. Distribution of Affected U.S. Companies by Size: 2000**

### **2.2.3 Industry Trends**

During the 1970s and 1980s, integrated steelmakers shut down blast furnaces in response to reduced demand for steel, thereby reducing the demand for furnace coke. During the same period, many coke batteries were also shut down, thereby reducing the supply of coke. During the 1990s, the improved U.S. economy has produced strong demand for steel, and domestic coke consumption currently exceeds production. This deficit may increase because many domestic furnace coke batteries are approaching their life expectancies and may be shut down rather than rebuilt. However, no new coke batteries have been built and only two coke oven batteries have been rebuilt since 1990—National Steel in Ecorse, Michigan and Bethlehem Steel in Burns Harbor, Indiana (Agarwal et al., 1996). Most recent investments in new cokemaking have been made in non-recovery, rather than by-product recovery, coke batteries. In fact, LTV Steel Corporation and the U.S. Steelworkers Union are reportedly exploring the possibility of locating a non-recovery coke facility on the site of LTV's current coke plant in Pittsburgh (*American Metal Market*, 1998). LTV closed this coke plant at the end of 1997 because its operating and environmental performance deteriorated to the point that it was unable to meet CAA requirements without prohibitive investments of between \$400 and \$500 million (*New Steel*, 1997a).

Faced with the prospect of spending hundreds of millions of dollars to rebuild aging coke batteries, many integrated steelmakers have totally abandoned their captive cokemaking operations and now rely on outside suppliers. As of 1997, five integrated steel companies did not produce their own coke and had to purchase this input from merchant plants, foreign sources, or other integrated producers with coke surpluses. These integrated steel companies—Inland Steel, Rouge Steel, USS/Kobe Steel, WCI Steel, and Weirton Steel—had an estimated aggregate coke demand of 5.8 million short tons (Hogan and Koelble, 1996). In addition, four other integrated producers currently have coke deficits. However, there are few integrated producers with coke surpluses to take up the slack. Hogan and Koelble (1996) reported that only four integrated steelmakers had coke surpluses as of 1995. This number is now down to three with the March 1998 closing of Bethlehem Steel's coke operations in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania (*New Steel*, 1998b). These recent closures by LTV and Bethlehem removed 2.4 million short tons, or 10.5 percent, of U.S. coke capacity (*New Steel*, 1998b).

Furthermore, several integrated firms have sold some or all of their coke batteries to merchant companies, which then sell the majority of the coke they produce to the steel company at which the battery is located. Some of these are existing coke batteries, and others are newly rebuilt batteries, including some that use the non-recovery cokemaking process. An example is the Indiana Harbor Coke Company's coke batteries located at Inland Steel's Indiana Harbor Works in East Chicago, Indiana. Both National Steel and Bethlehem Steel have recently sold coke batteries to DTE Energy Company (*New Steel*, 1998a; *New Steel*, 1997b). Both steel companies will continue to operate the batteries and will buy the majority of the coke produced by the batteries from DTE at market value (National Steel, 1998).

These recent trends should have the following future impacts on the U.S. coke industry:

- Reduce the share of furnace coke produced by integrated producers, thereby increasing reliance on merchant producers and foreign sources.
- Increase the furnace coke share of merchant production as these producers respond to expected increases in market prices for furnace coke, which also has lower production cost than foundry coke.
- Increase the volume of foreign imports of furnace and foundry coke as domestic demand continues to exceed domestic supply.

In 2000 and 2001, representatives from the coke industry (furnace and foundry) filed separate petitions alleging that the industry was materially injured or threatened with material injury from imports being sold at less than fair value (LTFV). After Commission investigations, the U.S. International Trade Commission found “no reasonable” indication the blast furnace coke industry was materially injured from these imports. In contrast, the Commission did find that foundry coke was sold in the United States at LTFV. As a result, the Secretary of Commerce issued an antidumping duty order on September 17, 2001 which assessed antidumping duties on foundry coke from China.

#### **2.2.4 Markets**

The U.S. coke industry has two primary product markets (i.e., furnace and foundry coke) that are supplied by two producing sectors—integrated producers and merchant producers. Integrated producers are part of integrated iron and steel mills and only produce furnace coke for captive use in blast furnaces. Therefore, much of the furnace coke is produced and consumed by the same integrated producer and never passes through a market. However, some integrated steel producers have closed their coke batteries over the past decade and must purchase their coke supply from merchant producers or foreign sources. In addition, a small number of integrated steelmakers produce more furnace coke than they need and sell their surplus to other integrated steelmakers. As of 1997, integrated producers accounted for roughly 76 percent of U.S. coke capacity with merchant producers accounting for the remaining 23 percent. These merchant producers sell furnace and foundry coke on the open market to integrated steel producers (i.e., furnace coke) and iron foundries (i.e., foundry coke). Some merchant producers sell both furnace and foundry coke, while others specialize in only one.

Although captive consumption currently dominates the U.S. furnace coke market, open market sales of furnace coke are increasing (USITC, 1994). Because of higher production costs, U.S. integrated steel producers have been increasing their consumption of furnace coke from merchant coke producers, foreign imports, and other integrated steel producers with coke surpluses. Although concentration ratios indicate that the U.S. furnace market is slightly concentrated, it is expected to be competitive at the national level after factoring in competition from foreign imports and integrated producers with coke surpluses.

Merchant coke producers account for a small share of U.S. furnace coke production (about 12 percent in 1997); however, they account for 100 percent of U.S. foundry coke production. The U.S. foundry market appears to be fairly concentrated with two companies currently accounting for almost 68 percent of U.S. production—Drummond Company

Incorporated with 45 percent and Citizens Gas and Coke with 22.6 percent. The remaining four merchant producers each account for between 7.5 and 8.8 percent of the market. However, these producers do not produce a differentiated product and are limited to selling only to iron foundries, and these factors limit their ability to influence prices. In addition, the strategic location of these manufacturers would appear to promote competition within the southeastern and north-central United States and, perhaps, across regions given access to water transportation. Thus, the U.S. market for foundry coke is also expected to be competitive at the national level.

### **2.3 Market Data**

The average annual production growth rate for furnace and foundry coke declined approximately 2.6 percent for the period 1990 and 2001 (see Table 2-5). Production fell significantly between 2000 and 2001 (9.0 percent) as a result of declining economic conditions in the United States and high volumes of Chinese imports. In 2000, 17.7 million short tons of furnace coke and 1.3 million short tons of foundry coke were produced domestically (see Table 2-6).

Apparent consumption of coke declined by almost 2 percent between 1990 and 2001, while levels have fluctuated in recent years. In 2001, coke consumption fell to its lowest level in over 2 decades. This follows trends in the integrated iron and steel sector, the primary consumer of domestic coke. The steel industry has faced strong import competition and declining national economic conditions during this period.

Export ratios indicate that 5.5 percent of domestic production was sold overseas in 2000 (see Table 2-7). This ratio has more than doubled over the past 10 years, from an initial level of 2.1 percent in 1990. The imports have also grown throughout the decade, and comprised over 16 percent of U.S. consumption in 2000. China and Japan are particularly strong suppliers to U.S. markets.

The average price per ton for coke has fluctuated moderately during the past decade. Price volatility was greatest during the latter part of the 1990s, with 1999–2000 exhibiting the largest variation in prices, a drop of nearly 8 percent (see Figure 2-6). From the fourth quarter of 1999 to the second quarter of 2001, the price of furnace coke fluctuated modestly between \$109 and \$112 per short ton (USITC, 2001c). Between the third quarter of 1998 and the first quarter of 2000, foundry coke prices declined steadily, falling from \$165 to \$161 per short ton (USITC, 2001b). Substantially lower import prices on coke put downward pressure on domestic prices throughout this period, according to the ITC.

**Table 2-5. U.S. Production, Foreign Trade, and Apparent Consumption of Coke: 1980-1997 (10<sup>3</sup> short tons)**

Year	U.S. Production	Exports	Imports	Changes in Inventories	Apparent Consumption <sup>a</sup>
1980	46,132	2,071	659	3,442	41,278
1981	42,786	1,170	527	-1,903	44,046
1982	28,115	993	120	1,466	25,776
1983	25,808	665	35	-4,672	29,850
1984	30,561	1,045	582	198	29,900
1985	28,651	1,122	578	-1,163	29,270
1986	25,540	1,004	329	-487	25,352
1987	26,304	574	922	-1,012	27,664
1988	28,945	1,093	2,688	529	30,011
1989	28,045	1,085	2,311	336	28,935
1990	27,617	572	1,078	-1	28,124
1991	24,046	740	1,185	189	24,302
1992	23,410	642	2,098	-224	25,090
1993	23,182	835	2,155	-422	24,924
1994	22,686	660	3,338	-525	25,889
1995	23,749	750	3,820	366	26,453
1996	23,075	1,121	2,543	21	24,476
1997	22,115	832	3,185	3	24,465
1998	20,041	1129	3,834	-361	23,107
1999	20,016	898	3,224	-81	22,423
2000	20,808	1146	3,781	202	23,241
2001	18,949	1069	2,340	-73	20,293
<b>Average Annual Growth Rates</b>					
1980-2001	-2.9%	-0.9%	14.6%		-2.2%
1980-1989	-4.6%	-4.7%	24.0%		-3.7%
1990-2001	-2.6%	5.5%	8.5%		-1.9%

<sup>a</sup> Apparent consumption is equal to U.S. production minus exports plus imports minus changes in inventories.

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy. "AER Database: Coke Overview, 1949-1997." <<http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/aer/aer-toc-d.cfm>>. Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration. As obtained on September 14, 1998a.  
Hogan, William T., and Frank T. Koelble. 1996. "Steel's Coke Deficit: 5.6 Million Tons and Growing." *New Steel* 12(12):50-59.  
U.S. International Trade Commission. Trade Database: Version 1.7.1. <[http://205.197.120.17/scripts/user\\_set.asp](http://205.197.120.17/scripts/user_set.asp)> As obtained in September 1998.  
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. 2002. Quarterly Coal Report: January-March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy. <[http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/quarterly/qcr\\_sum.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/quarterly/qcr_sum.html)>.

**Table 2-6. Domestic Coke Production by Type: 1998-2000**


Year	Furnace	Share	Foundry	Share	Other	Share	Total
1998	17,637	88.0%	1,364	6.8%	1,040	5.2%	20,041
1999	16,976	84.8%	1,376	6.9%	1,665	8.3%	20,016
2000	17,747	85.3%	1,257	6.0%	1,804	8.7%	20,808

Sources: U.S. International Trade Commission. July 2000. "Foundry Coke: A Review of the Industries in the United States and China." <<http://www.usitc.gov/sec/I0917W1.htm>>.  
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. 2002. Quarterly Coal Report: January–March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy.  
<[http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/quarterly/qcr\\_sum.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/quarterly/qcr_sum.html)>.  
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 2001c. "Blast Furnace Coke from China and Japan." Investigations Nos. 731-TA-951-952 (Preliminary) Publication 3444; August 2001.  
<<http://www.usitc.gov/wais/reports/arc/w3449.htm>>.

**Table 2-7. Foreign Trade Concentration for Coke Production**

Year	Export Ratio	Import Ratio
1990	2.1%	3.8%
1991	3.1%	4.9%
1992	2.7%	8.4%
1993	3.6%	8.6%
1994	2.9%	12.9%
1995	3.2%	14.4%
1996	4.9%	10.4%
1997	3.8%	13.0%
1998	5.6%	16.6%
1999	4.5%	14.4%
2000	5.5%	16.3%

Sources: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. 2002. Quarterly Coal Report: January–March 2002. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy.  
<[http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/quarterly/qcr\\_sum.html](http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/quarterly/qcr_sum.html)>.



**Figure 2-6. Price Trends for Coke: 1992–2001**



## **SECTION 3**

### **ENGINEERING COST ANALYSIS**

Control measures implemented to comply with the MACT standard will impose regulatory costs on coke batteries. This section presents compliance costs for representative “model” batteries and the estimate of national compliance costs associated with the rule. These engineering costs are defined as the initial capital and annual operating costs assuming no behavioral market adjustment by producers or consumers. For input to the EIA, engineering costs are expressed per unit of coke production and used to shift the coke supply functions in the market model.

The final MACT will cover the “Coke Ovens: Pushing, Quenching, and Battery Stacks” source category. It will affect all 46 by-product coke oven batteries at 17 coke plants. The processes covered by the regulation include pushing the coke from the coke oven, quenching the incandescent coke with water in a quench tower, and the battery stack which is the discharge point for the underfiring system. Capital, operating, and monitoring costs were estimated for representative model batteries. Model battery costs were linked to the existing population of coke batteries to estimate the national costs of the regulation.

#### **3.1 Overview of Emissions from Coke Batteries**

The listed HAP of concern is “coke oven emissions,” which includes hundreds of organic compounds formed when volatiles are thermally distilled from the coal during the coking process. Traditionally, benzene-soluble organics and methylene chloride-soluble organics have been used as surrogate measures of coke oven emissions. The primary constituents of concern are polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons. Other constituents include benzene, toluene, and xylene.

Coke oven emissions occur from pushing and quenching when the coal has not been fully coked, which is called a “green” push. A green push produces a dense cloud of coke oven emissions that is not captured and controlled by the emission control systems used for particulate matter. Coke oven emissions occur from battery stacks when raw coke oven gas leaks through the oven walls, enters the flues of the underfiring system, and is discharged through the stack. Coke oven emissions from these sources are controlled by pollution

prevention activities, diagnostic procedures, and corrective actions. One component of the control technology is good systematic operation and maintenance of the battery to prevent green pushes and stack emissions.

Based on limited test data and best engineering judgment, the final standards are expected to reduce coke oven emissions from pushing, quenching, and battery stacks by about 50 percent. There is uncertainty in estimates of emissions and emission reductions because the emissions are fugitive in nature. For example, the emissions from green coke during pushing and quenching are not enclosed or captured in a conveyance, which makes accurate measurement of concentrations and flow rates very difficult (or impossible).

### **3.2 Approach for Estimating Compliance Costs**

The costs for individual batteries to achieve the MACT level of control will vary depending on the battery condition and control equipment in place. There is uncertainty in determining exactly what costs will be incurred by each battery. Consequently, several model batteries were developed to represent the range of battery types and conditions to place bounds on the probable costs. Several repair categories were developed, and after review by the Coke Oven Environmental Task Force (COETF) of the American Coke and Coal Chemicals Institute (ACCCI), the number of categories was expanded. The repair categories recommended by COETF are given in Table 3-1. Costs estimates for each type of repair and any lost production associated with them were also provided by COETF based on the experience of coke plant operators. These cost estimates were then applied to each repair category to estimate the costs for model batteries.

Actual batteries were assigned to model batteries based on opacity data, discussions with plant operators, information from site visits, conversations with inspectors from state agencies, and best judgment based on battery age and repair history. The battery assignments to specific repair categories are given in Table 3-1. The most uncertainty in the assignment to model batteries is for those batteries for which the least information is available. These batteries were assigned to the more extensive repair groups. Consequently, the costs to be incurred by these batteries may be overstated because they may not require the extensive repairs that were assumed. In addition, some of these batteries may have required repairs to continue operating even without the MACT standard.

**Table 3-1. Repair Categories and Assignment of Batteries**

<b>Repair Category</b>	<b>Batteries Assigned</b>
<b>A</b> —Battery in good condition and can already meet the emission limits	USS Clairton Works (12 batteries) USS Gary Works (4 batteries) Bethlehem Steel—Burns Harbor (2 batteries) Citizen's Gas Battery 1
<b>B</b> —Needs a baseline program (includes special program for tall batteries; coal quality assurance/quality control, inspection procedures, extensive oven patching and welding for all batteries)	ABC Coke 1, 5, and 6 plus all batteries listed below in other categories
<b>C</b> —Needs baseline program plus end flue repair for 25 percent of the ovens	AK Steel (KY) 3 and 4 AK Steel (OH) 3 ISG - Warren 4 Shenango 1 Sloss 5 Tonawanda 2 Koppers 1 and 2 Citizens Gas E and H Empire 1 and 2 Wheeling-Pittsburgh 1, 2, and 3 National Granite City A and B
<b>D</b> —Needs baseline program, 1 through wall, 5 end flue repairs	Erie Coke A and B Sloss 3 and 4
<b>E</b> —Tall battery that needs baseline program	National Steel, Ecorse 5
<b>F</b> —Tall battery that needs baseline program plus end flue repair for 25 percent of the ovens	Wheeling-Pittsburgh 8

### 3.3 Costs for MACT Performance

The MACT standard involves a routine program of good systematic operation and maintenance and oven repairs to control emissions from battery stacks and pushing. In addition, batteries in poor condition may have to rebuild oven walls and end flues. An important element of this routine program for battery stacks is the use of continuous opacity monitors (COM). In addition, control of quenching emissions will require the installation of baffles in three quench towers that do not have them.

### ***3.3.1 Costs for the Baseline Program***

The baseline program includes routine oven patching, coal quality control, and other measures that are used by the best controlled batteries. The cost elements for the baseline program were provided by COETF and are discussed below.

- a. **Oven patching**: Add one patcher, include extensive ceramic welding repairs to two ovens per year, and account for lost production while welding and patching. The estimated costs in \$/yr per oven are \$2,917 for a short foundry coke battery, \$2,933 for a short furnace coke battery, and \$3,083 for a tall furnace coke battery.
- b. **Coal testing program**: Implement a quality assurance/quality control program for coal, including bulk density, size, blend composition, and moisture. Estimate a capital cost of \$10,000 (\$167/oven) to develop a statistical sampling program and an operating cost of \$72,000/yr (\$1,200/yr per oven) for one lab technician.
- c. **Inspections**: Capital cost of \$6,000 (\$100/oven) to develop procedures for hard pushes. Estimate the operating cost for periodic refractory inspection, documentation and specifications for pressure and contraction as \$4,000/yr or \$67/yr per oven.
- d. **Special testing and procedures for tall batteries**: Capital costs include an initial structural evaluation to determine acceptable wall pressure (\$40,000 or \$667/oven), testing equipment for coal (\$263,000 for testing equipment or \$4,383/oven), and equipment for field tests of coking pressures (\$10,000 for testing equipment or \$167/oven). Operating costs include testing moisture and bulk density of the coal (\$20,000/yr or \$333/yr per oven), test all coal for “Go/No Go” status (\$168,000/yr for 2.4 lab technicians, \$10,000/yr for maintenance, or \$2,970/yr per oven), one “No Go” per year with 6 hours lost production (\$31,000/yr or \$517/yr per oven), and periodic field tests of coking pressures (\$12,000/yr for labor or \$200/yr per oven). This results in a total operating cost for a tall 60-oven battery of \$241,000/yr or \$4,017/yr per oven.

### ***3.3.2 Major Repairs***

Some batteries may incur a one-time capital expense to rebuild oven walls and end flues to achieve the level of control associated with the best performing batteries. Cost estimates for these major repairs were provided by COETF based on the experience of coke plant operators.

- a. **End flue repairs**: For Category C and F batteries, assume 25 percent of the ovens need end flue repairs. For the small Category D foundry batteries (less than 50 ovens), assume 5 ovens need end flue repairs. Estimate the cost as \$175,000 per oven for short batteries and \$245,000 per oven for tall batteries. For lost coke production during the repair, add \$78,000 per oven for short foundry batteries, \$130,000 for

short furnace batteries, and \$220,000 for tall batteries. (The cost of lost production is based on \$62/ton for furnace coke and \$73/ton for foundry coke.)

- b. **Through wall repairs:** For Category D batteries, COETF recommended using one through wall repair for small batteries (less than 50 ovens). Estimate the cost as \$800,000 per through wall. For lost coke production during the repair, add \$113,000 per through wall for short foundry batteries.
- c. **Oven patching:** Include a capital cost for one-time patching for all ovens for batteries in Categories C, D, and F at \$525/oven.

### **3.3.3 Quenching**

Three quench towers at two coke plants will require the installation of baffles: one quench tower at Erie Coke and two quench towers at Tonawanda Coke. The capital cost for installing baffles with a water spray cleaning system in quench towers is \$140,000 (based on responses to EPA's cost survey).

### **3.3.4 Monitoring Costs**

The following monitoring costs are included.

- a. The capital cost for installing a continuous opacity monitor (COM) is \$37,000 and the operating cost is \$8,000/yr (based on responses to EPA's cost survey). A total of 18 stacks will require new COM.
- b. The capital cost for installing a bag leak detection system is \$9,000 and the operating cost is \$500/yr. There are 18 baghouses applied to pushing emissions.
- c. Method 9 observations of 4 pushes per battery per day have an annual cost of \$11,000 times the number of batteries (approximately one hour per day per battery for observations) plus \$22,000 per coke plant (2 hours per day for travel time and data entry). These costs will be incurred by batteries that are not currently making Method 9 observations (38 batteries at 17 plants, adjusting for cases in which two small batteries are operated as a single battery).
- d. Other costs include the startup, shutdown, and malfunction plan (assume 40 hrs every 5 years or 8 hrs/yr), operation and maintenance plan (assume 40 hrs every 5 years or 8 hrs/yr), Method 5 testing (80 hrs every 2.5 years or 32 hrs/yr), monthly inspections of control equipment (2 hrs/month or 24 hrs/yr), and notifications and records (40 hrs/yr) for a total of 112 hrs/yr. Using a typical labor rate of \$50/hr, these costs total \$5,600/yr.

### 3.3.5 Capital Recovery Factors

Capital recovery factors are used to annualize the cost of capital to estimate total annual cost. The equipment lifetimes and capital recovery factors (based on 7 percent interest) are given in Table 3-2.

**Table 3-2. Capital Recovery Factors (at 7 percent interest)**

Life (years)	Capital Recovery Factor	Capital Items
5	0.244	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Initial structural evaluation to determine acceptable wall pressure</li><li>• Develop a coal QA/QC program</li><li>• Develop procedures for tracking and addressing sticker pushes</li><li>• Equipment for field tests of coking pressure</li></ul>
10	0.142	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• End flue repairs</li><li>• Continuous opacity monitor</li><li>• Bag leak detector</li></ul>
15	0.110	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Testing equipment for coal</li></ul>
20	0.094	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Through wall repairs</li><li>• Baffles for quench towers</li></ul>

## 3.4 Estimates of Nationwide Costs

Tables 3-3 and 3-4 illustrate the development of nationwide costs for the baseline program and for major repairs. The cost functions discussed earlier in \$/oven were applied to the appropriate categories of model batteries, and the cost elements were summed to get a total cost for each model battery. Nationwide costs were estimated by multiplying the model battery cost by the number of actual batteries associated with each model battery. The tables show a total capital cost of \$88 million and a total annual cost of \$19 million/yr for the baseline program and major repairs.

Other costs associated with MACT include installing baffles in quench towers, monitoring, reporting, and recordkeeping. Table 3-5 presents the nationwide costs for these additional items as well battery repair costs. The total nationwide capital cost is estimated as \$89.5 million with a total annualized cost of \$20.2 million/yr.

**Table 3-3. Capital Costs for Battery Repairs and Baseline Program (\$1,000)<sup>a</sup>**

Category	Baseline Program Only				Baseline plus Repair 25 Percent of End Flues								Baseline, End Flues, through Walls	
	B	B	B	E	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	F	D	D
Short/Tall	Short	Short	Foundry	Tall	Short	Short	Short	Short	Short	Short	Short	Tall	Short	Short
Coke type	Foundry	Foundry	Foundry	Furnace	Foundry	Foundry	Furnace	Furnace	Furnace	Furnace	Furnace	Furnace	Foundry	Foundry
No. of ovens	76	37	37	76	64	37	37	37	64	76	76	76	37	37
Actual batteries represented	1	2	2	1	5	4	4	4	1	4	4	1	4	4
<b>Cost for baseline program:</b>														
Structural evaluation				51									51	
Coal testing				333									333	
Pressure testing				13									13	
Develop procedures for sticker pushes	8	4	4	8	6	4	4	4	6	8	8	8	4	4
Coal QA/QC	13	6	6	13	11	6	6	6	11	13	13	13	6	6
<b>Total for baseline</b>	20	10	10	417	17	10	10	10	17	20	20	417	10	10
Endflue repairs														
Lost production					2,800	1,619	1,619	1,619	2,800	3,325	4,655	4,655	875	875
Through wall repairs					1,248	722	1,203	1,203	2,080	2,470	4,180	4,180	390	390
Lost production													800	800
Patch all ovens													113	113
					34	19	19	19	34	40	40	40	19	19
Cost per model battery	20	10	10	417	4,099	2,370	2,851	2,851	4,931	5,855	9,292	9,292	2,207	2,207
Nationwide cost <sup>b</sup>	20	20	20	417	20,493	9,478	11,402	11,402	4,931	23,421	9,292	9,292	8,829	8,829
													<b>Total nationwide capital cost = \$88.3 million</b>	

<sup>a</sup> All costs are in 2001 dollars.

<sup>b</sup> Cost per model battery times the number of actual batteries represented.

**Table 3-4. Total Annual Costs for Battery Repairs and Baseline Program (\$1,000)<sup>a</sup>**

	Baseline Program Only				Baseline Program plus Repair 25 Percent of End Flues								Baseline, End Flues, through Walls
	B	B	E		C	C	C	C	C	C	F	D	
Group	Short	Short	Tall		Short	Short	Short	Short	Short	Short	Tall	Short	
Coke type	Foundry	Furnace	Furnace		Foundry	Foundry	Furnace	Furnace	Furnace	Furnace	Furnace	Foundry	
No. of ovens	76	37	76		64	37	37	64	76	76	76	37	
Actual batteries represented	1	2	1		5	4	4	1	4	1	1	4	
Capital recovery, baseline program	2.9	1.4	48.5		2.4	1.4	1.4	2.4	2.9	48.5		1.4	
Tall battery coke/coal testing			305.3							305.3			
Baseline patch/weld	221.7	108.5	234.3		186.7	107.9	108.5	187.7	222.9	234.3		107.9	
Coal QA/QC	91.2	44.4	91.2		76.8	44.4	44.4	76.8	91.2	91.2		44.4	
Inspect/procedures	5.1	2.5	5.1		4.3	2.5	2.5	4.3	5.1	5.1		2.5	
<b>Total baseline/battery</b>	<b>320.8</b>	<b>156.8</b>	<b>684.3</b>		<b>270.2</b>	<b>156.2</b>	<b>156.8</b>	<b>271.2</b>	<b>322.1</b>	<b>684.3</b>		<b>156.2</b>	
Capital recovery, end flues	—	—	—		399	231	231	399	473	663		125	
Capital recovery, through walls	—	—	—		—	—	—	—	—	—		76	
Capital recovery, lost production for repairs	—	—	—		178	103	171	296	352	595		66	
Capital recovery, patching all ovens	—	—	—		4.8	2.8	2.8	4.8	5.7	5.7		2.8	
Cost per model battery	321	157	684		851	492	561	971	1,153	1,948		425	
Nationwide cost <sup>b</sup>	321	314	684		4,257	1,969	2,245	971	4,612	1,948		1,701	
<b>Total nationwide annual cost = \$19 million/yr</b>													

<sup>a</sup> All costs are in 2001 dollars.

<sup>b</sup> Cost per model battery times the number of actual batteries represented.



**Table 3-5. Estimated Nationwide Compliance Costs for Coke Batteries Associated with the MACT Floor<sup>a</sup>**

<b>Cost Element</b>	<b>Capital Cost (\$10<sup>6</sup>)</b>	<b>Total Annualized Cost (\$10<sup>6</sup>/yr)</b>
Baseline repair program	1.2	6.8
Major repairs (end flues, through walls, oven patching)	87.1	12.0
Baffles, continuous opacity monitors, bag leak detectors, daily Method 9 observations, and reporting, recordkeeping.	1.2	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>89.5</b>	<b>20.2</b>

<sup>a</sup> All costs are in 2001 dollars.

These costs estimates are expected to be upper bound costs for several reasons. If some batteries are in a serious state of disrepair as indicated by the model battery categories, they could incur these expenses in the future simply to keep operating even in the absence of the MACT standard. In addition, the repairs will help to maintain production and extend battery life; consequently, the true cost of lost coke production while the repairs are being made are overstated. Although we know which batteries can achieve MACT without any significant repairs, we have much less information on those that may not achieve it and what repairs would be required. Some of these batteries may implement more cost effective approaches than the extensive repairs assumed in this cost analysis.

## **SECTION 4**

### **ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS**

The final rule to control the release of HAPs from coke pushing and quenching operations will directly (through imposition of compliance costs) or indirectly (through changes in market prices) affect the entire U.S. iron and steel industry. Implementation of the final rule will increase the costs of producing furnace and foundry coke at affected facilities. As described in Section 3, these costs will vary across facilities and their coke batteries depending upon their physical characteristics and baseline controls. The response by these producers to these additional costs will determine the economic impacts of the regulation. Specifically, the impacts will be distributed across producers and consumers of coke, steel mill products, and iron castings through changes in prices and quantities in the affected markets. This section presents estimates of the economic impacts of the coke MACT using an economic model that captures the linkages between the furnace coke and steel mill products, and foundry coke and iron castings markets.

This section describes the data and approach used to estimate the economic impacts of this final rule for the baseline year of 2000. Section 4.1 presents the inputs for the economic analysis, including characterization of producers, markets, and the costs of compliance. Section 4.2 summarizes the conceptual approach to estimating the economic impacts on the affected industries. A fully detailed description of the economic impact methodology is provided in Appendix A. Lastly, Section 4.3 provides the results of the economic impact analysis.

#### **4.1 EIA Data Inputs**

Inputs to the economic analysis are a baseline characterization of directly and indirectly affected producers, their markets, and the estimated costs of complying with the final rule.

##### ***4.1.1 Producer Characterization***

As detailed in Section 2, the baseline characterization of integrated and merchant manufacturing plants is based on the facility responses to EPA's industry survey and industry data sources for 1997. In order to develop a baseline data set for coke batteries consistent

with the year 2000, EPA collected aggregate production and shipment data for furnace and foundry coke reported in recent USITC publications (USITC, 2001a,b,c). These reports distinguished the data by type of coke (furnace, foundry) and use (captive and merchant). Using this data, EPA applied factors to individual coke battery production data collected from the 1997 survey (see Table 2-2) that result in a data set that is consistent with aggregate baseline production values reported by USITC. Coke-specific cost equations were developed using the 1993 Coke Ovens MACT methodology (as described fully in Appendix B).

Plant-specific data on existing integrated steel producers were supplemented with secondary information from company 10K, 10K-405, and annual reports; the *1998 Directory of Iron and Steel Plants* published by the Association of Iron and Steel Engineers; *World Cokemaking Capacity* published by the International Iron and Steel Institute.


#### **4.1.2 Market Characterization**

Figure 4-1 summarizes the market interactions included in the Agency's EIA modeling approach. Changes in the equilibrium price and quantity due to control costs on coke batteries were estimated simultaneously in four linked markets:

- market for furnace coke,
- market for foundry coke,
- market for steel mill products, and
- market for iron castings.

As described in Section 2, many captive coke plants supply their excess coke to the furnace coke market. Merchant coke plants and foreign imports account for the remaining supply to the furnace coke market. Furnace coke produced at captive coke plants and shipped directly to integrated iron and steel mills owned by their parent companies does not directly enter the market for furnace coke. However, compliance costs incurred by captive, or "in-house", furnace coke batteries indirectly affect the furnace coke market through price and output changes in the steel mill products market.

The market demand for furnace coke is derived from integrated mills producing steel mill products. Integrated iron and steel mills that need more coke than their captive batteries can produce purchase furnace coke from the market. Integrated mills' market (and captive) demand for furnace coke depends on their production levels as influenced by the market for steel mill products. Steel mill products are supplied by three general groups: integrated iron



**Figure 4-1. Market Linkages Modeled in the Economic Impact Analysis**

and steel mills, nonintegrated steel mills (primarily minimills), and imports. Domestic consumers of steel mill products and exports account for the market demand.

As described in Section 2, domestic and foreign merchant plants are the suppliers of foundry coke to the market. Consumers of foundry coke include foundries with cupolas that produce iron castings, and they are modeled using aggregate market demand curves.<sup>1</sup>

Table 4-1 provides the 2000 data on the U.S. furnace and foundry coke, steel mill products, and iron castings markets for use in this analysis. Coke prices were obtained from USITC reports (USITC, 2000b, 2000c). The market price for steel mill products was obtained from Current Industrial Reports (CIR) and reflects the production-weighted average across all product types. The market price for iron castings was also obtained from CIR and reflects the production-weighted average across iron castings (ductile, gray, and malleable). Domestic production from affected facilities reflects the aggregate of the plant-specific data developed from survey and secondary data sources, while unaffected domestic production is derived either directly from secondary sources or as the difference between observed total U.S. production and the aggregate production from affected facilities. Foreign trade data were obtained from industry and government statistical publications supplemented by survey data. Market volumes for each product are then computed as the sum of U.S. production and foreign imports.

#### ***4.1.3 Regulatory Control Costs***

As shown in Section 3, the Agency developed compliance cost estimates for model plants that may be mapped to each of the coke manufacturing facilities affected by the final rule. These estimates reflect the “most-reasonable” scenario for this industry. To be consistent with the 2000 baseline industry characterization of the economic model, the Agency adjusted the nationwide compliance cost estimate of \$20.2 expressed in 2001 dollars (Table 3-5) to be \$20.1 million as expressed in 2000 dollars using an engineering cost index.<sup>2</sup> These cost estimates serve as inputs to the economic analysis and affect the operating decisions for each affected facility and thereby the markets that are served by these facilities.

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<sup>1</sup>Other coke, frequently grouped with foundry coke, is purchased as a fuel input by cement plants, chemical plants, and nonferrous smelters. For simplicity, supply and demand for other coke are assumed to be unaffected by the final coke regulation and are not included in the market model.

<sup>2</sup> EPA used the chemical engineering plant cost index with the following values:  $\left[ \frac{394.1}{395.1} \right] = 0.997$

**Table 4-1. Baseline Characterization of U.S. Iron and Steel Markets: 2000**

	Baseline
<b>Furnace Coke</b>	
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$112.00
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	12,004
Domestic production <sup>a</sup>	8,904
Imports	3,100
<b>Foundry Coke</b>	
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$161.00
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	1,385
Domestic production	1,238
Imports	147
<b>Steel Mill Products</b>	
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$489.45
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	147,007
Domestic production	109,050
Integrated producers	57,153
Nonintegrated steel mills <sup>b</sup>	51,897
Imports	37,957
<b>Iron Castings</b>	
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$1,028.50
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	8,793
Domestic production <sup>a</sup>	8,692
Cupola furnaces	5,210
Electric furnaces <sup>c</sup>	3,482
Imports	101

<sup>a</sup> Includes minimills.

<sup>b</sup> Excludes captive production.

<sup>c</sup> Includes electric arc or electric induction furnaces.

## 4.2 EIA Methodology Summary


In general, the EIA methodology needs to allow EPA to consider the effect of the different regulatory alternatives. Several types of economic impact modeling approaches have been developed to support regulatory development. These approaches can be viewed as varying along two modeling dimensions:

- the scope of economic decision making accounted for in the model, and
- the scope of interaction between different segments of the economy.


Each of these dimensions was considered in selecting the approach used to model the economic impact of the final coke regulation.

To conduct the analysis for the final coke regulation, the Agency used a market modeling approach that incorporates behavioral responses in a multiple-market partial equilibrium model. Multiple-market partial equilibrium analysis provides a manageable approach to incorporate interactions between coke, steel mill product, and iron castings markets into the EIA to better estimate the final regulation's impact. The multiple-market partial equilibrium approach represents an intermediate step between a simple, single-market partial equilibrium approach and a full general equilibrium approach. The modeling technique is to link a series of standard partial equilibrium models by specifying the interactions between the supply and demand for products and then solving for changes in prices and quantities across all markets simultaneously. The EIA methodology is fully detailed in Appendix A.

The Agency's methodology is soundly based on standard microeconomic theory relying heavily on previous economic analyses, employs a comparative static approach, and assumes certainty in relevant markets. For this analysis, prices and quantities are determined in perfectly competitive markets for furnace coke, foundry coke, finished steel mill products, and iron castings. The competitive model of price formation, as shown in Figure 4-2 (a), posits that market prices and quantities are determined by the intersection of market supply and demand curves. Under the baseline scenario, a market price and quantity ( $P$ ,  $Q$ ) are determined by the downward-sloping market demand curve ( $D^M$ ) and the upward-sloping market supply curve ( $S^M$ ) that reflects the horizontal summation of the individual supply curves of directly affected and indirectly affected facilities that produce a given product.



**a) Baseline Equilibrium**



**b) With-Regulation Equilibrium**

**Figure 4-2. Market Equilibrium without and with Regulation**



With the regulation, the cost of production increases for directly affected producers. The imposition of the compliance costs is represented as an upward shift in the supply curve for each affected facility from  $S_a$  to  $S_a'$ . As a result, the market supply curve shifts upward to  $S^M'$  as shown in Figure 4-2(b) reflecting the increased costs of production at these facilities. In the baseline scenario without the final standards, the industry would produce total output,  $Q$ , at the price,  $P$ , with affected facilities producing the amount  $q_a$  and unaffected facilities accounting for  $Q$  minus  $q_a$ , or  $q_u$ . At the new equilibrium with the regulation, the market price increases from  $P$  to  $P'$  and market output (as determined from the market demand curve,  $D^M$ ) declines from  $Q$  to  $Q'$ . This reduction in market output is the net result from reductions at affected facilities and increases at unaffected facilities.

### **4.3 Economic Impact Results**

Based on the simple analytics presented above, when faced with higher costs of coke production, producers will attempt to mitigate the impacts by making adjustments to shift as much of the burden on other economic agents as market conditions allow. The adjustments available to facility operators include changing production processes, changing inputs, changing output rates, or even closing the facility. This analysis focuses on the last two options because they appear to be the most viable for coke manufacturing facilities, at least in the near-term. A large segment of the furnace and foundry coke market is affected by the regulation so we would expect upward pressure on prices as producers reduce output rates in response to higher costs. Higher prices reduce quantity demanded and output for each market product, leading to changes in profitability of batteries, facilities, and firms. These market and industry adjustments will also determine the social costs of the regulation and its distribution across stakeholders (producers and consumers).

To estimate these impacts, the economic modeling approach described in Appendix A was operationalized in a multiple spreadsheet model. This model characterizes those producers and consumers identified in Figure 4-1 and their behavioral responses to the imposition of the regulatory compliance costs. These costs are expressed per ton of furnace or foundry coke and serve as the input to the economic model, or “cost-shifters” of the baseline supply curves at affected facilities. Given these costs, the model determines a new equilibrium solution in a comparative static approach. The following sections provide the Agency’s estimates of the resulting economic impacts for the final rule.

#### **4.3.1 Market-Level Impacts**

The increased cost of coke production due to the regulation is expected to increase the price of furnace coke and steel mill products and reduce their production and consumption from 2000 baseline levels. As shown in Table 4-2, the regulation is projected to increase the price of furnace coke by 2.6 percent, or \$3.00 per short ton. The increased captive production costs and higher market price associated with furnace coke are projected to increase steel mill product prices by less than 0.1 percent, or \$0.14 per ton. As expected, directly affected output declines across all producers, while supply from domestic and foreign producers not subject to the regulation increases. Although the resulting net declines are slight across all products (i.e., less than 1 percent decline in market output) the change in domestic production is typically higher than 0.1 percent. This is especially true for furnace coke where domestic production declines by 3.9 percent.

In contrast, the regulation showed no impact on price or quantity in the foundry coke market. This is due to the capacity constraints on domestic producers and the role of foreign imports. The supply of foundry coke is characterized by a domestic step supply function augmented by foreign supply, with foreign suppliers being the high cost producers in the market. Because foreign suppliers are the high cost producers, they determine the market price and an upward shift in the domestic supply curve does not affect the equilibrium price or quantity. This implies that domestic foundry coke producers are not able to pass along any of the cost of the regulation. In addition, because there is no price change in the foundry coke market, the production of iron castings is unaffected by the regulation.

#### **4.3.2 Industry-Level Impacts**

Industry revenue, costs, and profitability change as prices and production levels adjust to increased production costs. As shown in Table 4-3, the economic model projects that profits for directly affected integrated iron and steel producers will decrease by \$22.4 million, or 3.0 percent. However, because the price increase exceeds the average cost increase, industry-level profits for U.S. merchant furnace coke producers are expected to increase by \$9.7 million, or 8.3 percent. In contrast, industry-level profits for U.S. merchant foundry coke producers are expected to decline by \$5.0 million, or 5.0 percent. These producers cannot pass along any of the control costs of the regulation because there is no price increase. Those domestic suppliers not subject to the regulation experience windfall gains with non-integrated steel mills (i.e., minimills) increasing profits by \$7.4 million.

**Table 4-2. Market-Level Impacts of the Final Coke MACT: 2000**

	Baseline	Changes From Baseline	
		Absolute	Percent
Furnace Coke			
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$112.00	\$3.00	2.68%
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	12,004	−91.8	−0.76%
Domestic production <sup>a</sup>	8,904	−347.9	−3.91%
Imports	3,100	256.1	8.26%
Foundry Coke			
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$161.00	0.0	0.00%
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	1,385	0.0	0.00%
Domestic production	1,238	0.0	0.00%
Imports	147	0.0	0.00%
Steel Mill Products			
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$489.45	\$0.14	0.03%
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	147,007	−26.4	−0.02%
Domestic production	109,050	−191.9	−0.18%
Integrated producers	57,153	−244.6	−0.43%
Nonintegrated steel mills <sup>b</sup>	51,897	52.7	0.10%
Imports	37,957	165.5	0.44%
Iron Castings			
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$1,028.50	\$0.00	0.00%
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	8,793	0.0	0.00%
Domestic production <sup>a</sup>	8,692	0.0	0.00%
Cupola furnaces	5,210	0.0	0.00%
Electric furnaces <sup>c</sup>	3,482	0.0	0.00%
Imports	101	0.0	0.00%

<sup>a</sup> Includes minimills.

<sup>b</sup> Excludes captive production.

<sup>c</sup> Includes electric arc or electric induction furnaces.

**Table 4-3. National-Level Industry Impacts of the Final Coke MACT: 2000**

		Changes From Baseline	
	Baseline	Absolute	Percent
Integrated Iron and Steel Mills			
Total revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$28,430.5	−\$99.9	−0.35%
Steel mill products	\$27,973.6	−\$111.62	−0.40%
Market coke operations	\$456.9	\$12.44	2.72%
Total costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$27,690.8	−\$76.81	−0.28%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$9.91	NA
Steel production	\$0.0	\$0.00	NA
Captive coke production	\$0.0	\$7.43	NA
Market coke production	\$0.0	\$2.48	NA
Production costs	\$27,690.8	−\$86.72	−0.315
Steel production	\$25,327.3	−\$110.43	−0.44%
Captive coke production	\$746.6	−\$0.06	−0.01%
Market coke consumption	\$1,249.5	\$23.71	1.90%
Market coke production	\$367.4	\$0.06	0.02%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$739.7	−\$22.38	−3.02%
Iron and steel facilities (#)	20	0	0.00%
Coke batteries (#)	37	0	0.00%
Employment (FTEs)	66,603	−323	−0.48%
Coke Producers (Merchant Only)			
Furnace			
Revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$521.8	−\$28.76	−5.51%
Costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$404.5	−\$38.45	−9.51%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$3.13	NA
Production costs	\$404.5	−\$41.57	−10.28%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$117.4	\$9.68	8.25%
Coke batteries (#)	17	−2	−11.76%
Employment (FTEs)	774	−193	−34.94%
Foundry			
Revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$245.5	\$0.56	0.23%
Costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$148.7	\$5.54	3.73%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$5.54	NA
Production costs	\$148.7	\$0.00	0.00%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$96.8	−\$4.98	−5.15%
Coke batteries (#)	12	0	0.00%
Employment (FTEs)	2,486	0	0.00%

(continued)

**Table 4-3. National-Level Industry Impacts of the Final Coke MACT: 2000  
(continued)**

	Baseline	Changes From Baseline	
		Absolute	Percent
Nonintegrated Steel Mills <sup>a</sup>			
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	NA	\$7.4	NA
Cupola Furnaces			
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	NA	\$0.0	NA
Captive	NA	\$0.0	NA
Merchant	NA	\$0.0	NA
Affected	NA	\$0.0	NA
Unaffected	NA	\$0.0	NA
Electric Furnaces <sup>b</sup>			
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	NA	\$0.0	NA
Captive	NA	\$0.0	NA
Merchant	NA	\$0.0	NA
Affected	NA	\$0.0	NA
Unaffected	NA	\$0.0	NA

<sup>a</sup> Includes minimills.

<sup>b</sup> Includes iron foundries that use electric arc or electric induction furnaces.

#### *4.3.2.1 Changes in Profitability*

For integrated steel mills, operating profits decline by \$22 million. This is the net result of three effects:

- Net decrease in revenue (\$99 million): Steel mill product revenue decreases as a result of reductions in output. However, these losses were mitigated by increased revenues from furnace coke supplied to the market as a result of higher prices.
- Net decrease in production costs (\$87 million): Reduction in steel mill and market coke production costs occur as output declines. However, producers also experience increases in costs associated with the higher price of inputs (i.e., furnace coke).
- Increase in control costs (\$10 million): The costs of captive production of furnace coke increase as a result of regulatory controls.

Industry-wide profits for merchant furnace coke producers increase by \$10 million as a result of the following:

- Decreases in revenue (\$29 million): Reductions in output outweigh revenue increases as a result of higher market prices.
- Reduction in production costs (\$42 million): Reduction in coke production costs occurs as output declines.
- Increased control costs (\$3 million): The cost of producing furnace coke increases as a result of regulatory controls.

Industry-wide profits for merchant foundry coke producers fall by \$5 million under the regulation:

- Increase in revenue (\$0.5 million): Given that we project no price changes for foundry coke, foundry coke revenue remains unchanged. However, small revenue increases occur because some batteries also produce small amounts of furnace coke.
- Reduction in production costs (\$0 million): No change in coke production costs occur as output remains unchanged.
- Increased control costs (\$5.6 million): The cost of producing foundry coke increases as a result of regulatory controls.

Lastly, domestic producers that are not subject to the regulation benefit from higher prices without additional control costs. As mentioned above, profits increase are projected for nonintegrated steel mills.

Additional distributional impacts of the rule within each producer segment are not necessarily apparent from the reported decline or increase in their aggregate operating profits. The regulation creates both gainers and losers within each industry segment based on the distribution of compliance costs across facilities. As shown in Table 4-4, a substantial subset of the merchant coke facilities are projected to experience profit increases (i.e., 13 furnace coke batteries and 1 foundry coke battery, or 62 percent). However, two merchant batteries are projected to cease market operations as they are the highest-cost coke batteries with the additional regulatory costs.

A majority of directly affected integrated iron and steel facilities (i.e., 16 plants, or 80 percent) are projected to become less profitable with the regulation with a total loss of \$33.9 million. However, four integrated mills are projected to benefit from higher prices and experience a total profit gain of \$11.5 million. These mills typically own furnace coke batteries with low production costs and lower per-unit compliance costs. In addition, a high proportion of their coke inputs are supplied internally.

**Table 4-4. Distribution Impacts of the Final Coke MACT Across Directly Affected Producers: 2000**

	With Regulation			Total
	Increased Profits	Decreased Profits	Closure	
Integrated Iron and Steel Mills				
Facilities (#)	4	16	0	20
Steel production				
Total (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	6,232	50,922	0	57,153
Average (tons/facility)	1,558	3,183	0	2,858
Steel compliance costs				
Total (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Average (\$/ton)	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Coke production				
Total (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	5,729	6,915	0	12,644
Average (tons/facility)	1,432	432	0	632
Coke compliance costs				
Total (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$0.17	\$9.74	\$0.00	\$9.91
Average (\$/ton)	\$0.03	\$1.41	\$0.00	\$0.78
Change in operating profit (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$11.47	−\$33.85	\$0.00	−\$22.38
Coke Plants (Merchant Only)				
Furnace				
Batteries (#)	13	2	2	17
Production (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)				
Total (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	3,979	391	267	4,637
Average (tons/facility)	306	196	134	273
Compliance costs				
Total (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$2.1	\$1.3	\$1.340	\$4.738
Average (\$/ton)	\$0.52	\$3.42	\$5.01	\$1.02
Change in operating profit (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$9.89	−\$0.16	−\$0.04	\$9.68
Foundry				
Batteries (#)	1	11	0	12
Production				
Total (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	476	1,181	0	1,657
Average (tons/facility)	476	107	0	138
Compliance costs				
Total (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$0.021	\$5.524	\$0.00	\$5.545
Average	\$0.04	\$4.68	\$0.00	\$3.35
Change in operating profit (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$0.54	−\$5.52	\$0.00	−\$4.98

#### *4.3.2.2 Facility Closures*

EPA estimates two merchant batteries supplying furnace coke are likely to prematurely close as a result of the regulation. In this case, these batteries are the highest-cost producers of furnace coke with the regulation.

#### *4.3.2.3 Changes in Employment*

As a result of decreased output levels, industry employment is projected to decrease by less than 1 percent, or 516 full-time equivalents (FTEs), with the regulation. This is the net result of employment losses for integrated iron and steel mills totaling 323 FTEs and merchant coke plants of 193 FTEs. Although EPA projects increases in output for producers not subject to the rule, which would likely lead to increases in employment, the Agency did not develop quantitative estimates for this analysis.

### **4.3.3 Social Cost**

The social impact of a regulatory action is traditionally measured by the change in economic welfare that it generates. The social costs of the final rule will be distributed across consumers and producers alike. Consumers experience welfare impacts due to changes in market prices and consumption levels associated with the rule. Producers experience welfare impacts resulting from changes in profits corresponding with the changes in production levels and market prices. However, it is important to emphasize that this measure does not include benefits that occur outside the market, that is, the value of reduced levels of air pollution with the regulation.

The national compliance cost estimates are often used as an approximation of the social cost of the rule. The engineering analysis estimated annual costs of \$20.1 million. In this case, the burden of the regulation falls solely on the affected facilities that experience a profit loss exactly equal to these cost estimates. Thus, the entire loss is a change in producer surplus with no change (by assumption) in consumer surplus. This is typically referred to as a “full-cost absorption” scenario in which all factors of production are assumed to be fixed and firms are unable to adjust their output levels when faced with additional costs.

In contrast, the economic analysis accounts for behavioral responses by producers and consumers to the regulation (i.e., shifting costs to other economic agents). This approach results in a social cost estimate that differs from the engineering estimate and also provides insights on how the regulatory burden is distributed across stakeholders. As shown in Table 4-5, the economic model estimates the total social cost of the rule to be



**Table 4-5. Distribution of the Social Costs of the Final Coke MACT: 2000**

Change in Consumer Surplus (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	<b>–\$20.87</b>
Steel mill product consumers	–\$20.87
Domestic	–\$19.94
Foreign	–\$0.93
Iron casting consumers	\$0.00
Domestic	\$0.00
Foreign	\$0.00
<b>Change in Producer Surplus (\$10<sup>6</sup>/yr)</b>	<b>\$2.25</b>
Domestic producers	–\$10.31
Integrated iron and steel mills	–\$22.38
Nonintegrated steel mills <sup>a</sup>	\$7.37
Cupola furnaces	\$0.00
Electric furnaces <sup>b</sup>	\$0.00
Furnace coke (merchant only)	\$9.68
Foundry coke (merchant only)	–\$4.98
Foreign producers	\$12.56
Iron and steel	\$2.86
Castings	\$0.00
Furnace coke	\$9.69
Foundry coke	\$0.00
<b>Change in Total Social Surplus (\$10<sup>6</sup>/yr)<sup>c</sup></b>	<b>–\$18.62</b>

<sup>a</sup> Includes minimills.

<sup>b</sup> Includes electric arc or electric induction furnaces.

<sup>c</sup> The negative change in total social surplus indicates the social cost of the regulation is \$18.62 million

\$18.6 million. This difference occurs because society reallocates resources through the predicted market adjustments that result from the regulation-induced increase in coke production costs.

In the final product markets, higher market prices lead to consumers of steel mill products experiencing losses of \$20.9 million. Although integrated iron and steel producers are able to pass on a limited amount of cost increases to their final consumers, e.g., automotive manufactures and construction industry, the increased costs result in a net decline in profits at integrated mills of \$22.4 million.

In the coke industry, low-cost merchant producers of furnace coke benefit at the expense of consumers and higher-cost coke batteries resulting in an industry-wide increase in profits. Furnace coke profits at merchant plants increase in aggregate by \$9.7 million. In contrast, foundry coke profits at merchant plants decline in aggregate by \$5 million.

Lastly, domestic producers not subject to the regulation (i.e., nonintegrated steel mills and electric furnaces) as well as foreign producers experience unambiguous gains because they benefit from increases in market price under both alternatives.

## **SECTION 5**

### **SMALL BUSINESS IMPACTS**

This regulatory action will potentially affect the economic welfare of owners of coke batteries. These individuals may be owners/operators who directly conduct the business of the firm or, more commonly, investors or stockholders who employ others to conduct the business of the firm on their behalf through privately held or publicly traded corporations. The legal and financial responsibility for compliance with a regulatory action ultimately rests with plant managers, but the owners must bear the financial consequences of the decisions. Although environmental regulations can affect all businesses, small businesses may have special problems complying with such regulations.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA) of 1980 requires that special consideration be given to small entities affected by federal regulations. The RFA was amended in 1996 by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) to strengthen its analytical and procedural requirements. Under SBREFA, the Agency must perform a regulatory flexibility analysis for rules that will have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.

This section focuses on the compliance burden of the small businesses with the coke manufacturing industry and provides a screening analysis to determine whether this final rule is likely to impose a significant impact on a substantial number of the small entities (SISNOSE) within this industry. The screening analysis employed here is a “sales test” that computes the annualized compliance costs as a share of sales for each company. In addition, it provides information about the impacts on small businesses after accounting for producer responses to the final rule and the resulting changes in market prices and output.

#### **5.1 Identifying Small Businesses**

The SBA released guidelines effective October 2000 that provide small business thresholds based on NAICS codes that replace the previous thresholds based on SIC codes. Under these new guidelines, SBA establishes 1,000 or fewer employees as the small business threshold for Iron and Steel Mills (i.e., NAICS 331111), while coke ovens not integrated with steel mills are classified under All Other Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing

(i.e., NAICS 324199) with a threshold of 500. Based on these SBA size definitions for the affected industries and reported sales and employment data, as described in Section 2, the Agency has identified three of the 14 companies as small businesses (i.e., 21 percent). The following businesses were identified as small for the purpose of this analysis:

- Citizen's Gas and Coke,
- Shenango Group, Inc., and
- Tonawanda Coke Corporation.

Each of these small companies owned and operated a coke plant with a total of seven coke batteries, or roughly 14 percent of all the coke batteries operated in 2002.

## **5.2 Screening-Level Analysis**

To assess the potential impact of this rule on small businesses, the Agency calculated the share of annual compliance costs relative to baseline sales for each company. When a company owns more than one affected facility, EPA combined the costs for each facility for the numerator of the test ratio. Annual compliance costs include annualized capital costs and operating and maintenance costs imposed on these companies.<sup>1</sup> They do not include changes in production or market adjustments.

Small businesses represent 21 percent of the companies within the source category and are expected to incur 19 percent of the total industry compliance costs of \$20.2 million (see Table 5-1). The average total annual compliance cost is projected to be \$1.3 million per small company, while the average for large companies is projected to be \$1.5 million per company. The mean (median) cost-to-sales ratio for small businesses is 2.0 percent (1.8 percent), with a range of 0.3 to 5.0 percent. EPA estimates that one of the two small businesses may experience an impact between 1 percent and 3 percent of sales, and one small business will experience an impact greater than 3 percent of sales. In contrast, all of the large companies are affected at less than 1 percent of sales.

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<sup>1</sup>Annualized capital costs include purchased equipment costs (PEC), direct costs for installation (DCI), and indirect costs for installation (ICI) related to engineering and start up. Operating and maintenance costs include direct annual costs (DAC), such as catalysis replacement, increased utilities, and increased labor, and indirect annual costs (IAC), such as costs due to tax, overhead, insurance, and administrative burdens.

**Table 5-1. Summary Statistics for SBREFA Screening Analysis: 2000**

	Small		Large		All Companies
Total Number of Companies	3		11		14
Total Annual Compliance Costs (TACC) (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$3.8		\$16.4		\$20.2
Average TACC per company (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$1.3		\$1.5		\$1.4
Compliance Cost-to-Sales Ratios					
Average	2.04%		0.09%		0.51%
Median	1.83%		0.08%		0.13%
Minimum	0.31%		<0.01%		<0.01%
Maximum	4.97%		0.25%		3.97%
	Number	Share	Number	Share	Number
Compliance costs are <1% of sales	1	33%	11	100%	12
Compliance costs are ≥ 1 to 3% of sales	1	33%	0	0%	1
Compliance costs are ≥ 3% of sales	1	33%	0	0%	1

Note: Assumes no market responses (i.e., price and output adjustments) by regulated entities.

### 5.3 Economic Analysis

The Agency also analyzed the economic impacts on small businesses under with-regulation conditions expected to result from implementing the MACT. Unlike the screening analysis, this approach examines small business impacts in light of the behavioral responses of producers and consumers to the regulation. As shown in Table 5-2, the economic model projects operating profits increase by \$0.3 million for the furnace coke plant operated by a small business. For this plant, furnace coke price increases outweigh the additional costs associated with the MACT. In contrast, the model projects operating profits decrease by \$2.4 million for foundry coke plants operated by small firms. In this case, foundry coke plants fully absorb additional control costs. No batteries (furnace or foundry) are projected to prematurely close as a result of the additional control costs associated with the regulation.

### 5.4 Assessment

Based on the *Quarterly Financial Report (QFR)* from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the average return to sales for all reporting companies within the iron and steel industry ranged from 3.2 to 4.6 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1998).<sup>2</sup> In addition, Dun & Bradstreet reports the median return on sales as 3.7 percent for SIC 3312—Steel Works, Blast Furnaces (including Coke Ovens), and Rolling Mills (Dun & Bradstreet, 1997). Although this industry is typically characterized by average profit margins, the Agency's analysis indicated that none of the coke manufacturing facilities owned by small businesses are at risk of closure because of the final rule. In fact, the furnace coke plant is projected to become more profitable in profits because of market feedbacks related to higher costs incurred by competitors, while the six plants manufacturing foundry coke are projected to experience a decline in profits of slightly less than 5 percent. In summary, this analysis supports certification under the RFA because, while a few small firms may experience initial impacts greater than 1 percent of sales, the Agency's economic analysis indicates no significant impacts on their viability to continue operations and remain profitable.

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<sup>2</sup>Furthermore, the *QFR* reports that companies within the iron and steel industry of less than \$25 million in assets reported an average return to sales ranging from 6.8 to 9.8 percent.

**Table 5-2. Small Business Impacts of the Final Coke MACT: 2000**

		Changes From Baseline	
	Baseline	Absolute	Percent
Coke Plants (Merchant Only)			
Furnace			
Revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$42.7	\$1.1	2.7%
Costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$40.9	\$0.9	2.2%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$0.9	NA
Production costs	\$40.9	\$0.0	0.0%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$1.8	\$0.3	13.9%
Coke batteries (#)	1	0	0.0%
Employment (FTEs)	175	0	0.0%
Foundry			
Revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$139.3	\$0.6	0.4%
Costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$86.8	\$2.9	3.4%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$2.9	NA
Production costs	\$86.8	\$0.0	0.0%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$52.4	−\$2.4	−4.5%
Coke batteries (#)	6	0	0.0%
Employment (FTEs)	1,760	0	0.0%
Total			
Revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$182.0	\$1.7	0.9%
Costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$127.7	\$3.8	3.0%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$3.8	NA
Production costs	\$127.7	\$0.0	0.0%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$54.3	−\$2.1	−3.9%
Coke batteries (#)	7	0	0.0%
Employment (FTEs)	1,935	0	0.0%

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## **APPENDIX A**

### **ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY**

This appendix provides the methodology for analyzing the economic impacts of the coke ovens, integrated iron and steel MACT, and iron foundry MACT standards to ensure consistency across the EIAs for each of these MACT standards. Implementation of this methodology provided the economic data and supporting information that EPA requires to support its regulatory determination. This approach is firmly rooted in microeconomic theory and the methods developed for earlier EPA studies to operationalize this theory. The Agency employed a computerized market model of the coke, steel mill products, and iron castings industries to estimate the behavioral responses to the imposition of regulatory costs and, thus, the economic impacts of the standard. The market model captures the linkages between these industries through changes in equilibrium prices and quantities.

This methodology section describes the conceptual approach selected for this EIA. For each product market included in the analysis, EPA derived facility-level supply functions and demand functions that are able to account for the behavioral response and market implications of the regulatory costs. Finally, this appendix presents an overview of the specific functional forms that constitute the Agency's computerized market model.

#### **A.1 Overview of Economic Modeling Approach**

In general, the EIA methodology needs to allow EPA to consider the effect of the different regulatory alternatives. Several types of economic impact modeling approaches have been developed to support regulatory development. These approaches can be viewed as varying along two modeling dimensions:

- the scope of economic decision making accounted for in the model, and
- the scope of interaction between different segments of the economy.

Each of these dimensions was considered in selecting the approach used to model the economic impact of the regulation. Bingham and Fox (1999) provide a useful summary of these dimensions as they relate to modeling the outcomes of environmental regulations.


For this analysis, prices and quantities are determined in perfectly competitive markets for furnace coke, foundry coke, steel mill products, and iron castings. The Agency analyzed the impact of the regulation using a market modeling approach that incorporates behavioral responses in a multiple-market partial equilibrium model. Multiple-market partial equilibrium analysis accounts for the interactions between coke, steel mill product, and iron castings markets into the EIA to better estimate the regulation's impact. The modeling technique is to link a series of standard partial equilibrium models by specifying the interactions between the supply and demand for products and then solving for changes in prices and quantities across all markets simultaneously.

Figure A-1 summarizes the market interactions included in the Agency's EIA modeling approach. Changes in the equilibrium price and quantity due to control costs associated with individual MACTs were estimated simultaneously in four linked markets:

- market for furnace coke,
- market for foundry coke,
- market for steel mill products, and
- market for iron castings.

As described in Section 2 of this EIA report, many captive coke plants supply their excess furnace coke to the market. Merchant coke plants and foreign imports account for the remaining supply to the furnace coke market. Furnace coke produced at captive coke plants and shipped directly to integrated iron and steel mills owned by their parent companies does not directly enter the market for furnace coke. However, compliance costs incurred by these captive, or "in-house," furnace coke batteries indirectly affect the furnace coke market through price and output changes in the steel mill products market.

The market demand for furnace coke is derived from integrated mills producing steel mill products. Integrated iron and steel mills that need more coke than their captive batteries can produce will purchase furnace coke from the market. Integrated mills' market demand for furnace coke depends on their production levels as influenced by the market for steel mill products. Steel mill products are supplied by three sources: integrated iron and steel mills, nonintegrated steel mills (primarily minimills), and imports. Domestic consumers of steel mill products and exports account for the market demand.



**Figure A-1. Market Linkages Modeled in the Economic Impact Analysis**

Domestic merchant plants are the primary suppliers of foundry coke to the market. However, the U.S. International Trade Commission (2000) has documented an increasing trend in foreign imports of foundry coke from China. Therefore, we have included a single import supply curve to characterize this supply segment.

In addition to furnace and foundry coke, merchant and captive coke plants sell a by-product referred to as “other coke” that is purchased as a fuel input by cement plants, chemical plants, and nonferrous smelters. Because “other coke” is a by-product and represented only 2 percent of U.S. coke production in 1997 it is not formally characterized by supply and demand in the market model. Revenues from this product are accounted for by assuming its volume is a constant proportion of the total amount of coke produced by a battery and sold at a constant price.


## **A.2 Conceptual Market Modeling Approach**

This section examines the impact of the regulations on the production costs for affected facilities, both merchant and captive. It provides an overview of the basic economic theory of the effect of regulations on facility production decisions and the concomitant effect on market outcomes. Following the *OAQPS Economic Analysis Resource Document* (EPA, 1999), we employed standard concepts in microeconomics to model the supply of affected products and the impacts of the regulations on production costs and the operating decisions. The approach relies heavily on previous economic analyses, employs a comparative static approach, and assumes certainty in relevant markets. The three main elements of the analysis are regulatory effects on the manufacturing facility, market responses, and facility–market interactions. The remainder of this section describes each of these main elements.

### **A.2.1 Facility-level Responses to Control Costs**

Individual plant-level production decisions were modeled to develop the market supply and demand for key industry segments in the analysis. Production decisions were modeled as intermediate-run decisions, assuming that the plant size, equipment, and technologies are fixed. For example, the production decision typically involves (1) whether a firm with plant and equipment already in place purchases inputs to produce output and (2) at what capacity utilization the plant should operate. A profit-maximizing firm will operate existing capital as long as the market price for its output exceeds its per-unit variable production costs, since the facility will cover not only the cost of its variable inputs but also part of its capital costs. Thus, in the short run, a profit-maximizing firm will not pass up an opportunity to recover even part of its fixed investment in plant and equipment.

The existence of fixed production factors gives rise to diminishing returns to those fixed factors and, along with the terms under which variable inputs are purchased, defines the upward-sloping form of the marginal cost (supply) curve employed for this analysis. Figure A-2 illustrates this derivation of the supply function at an individual mill based on the classical U-shaped cost structure. The MC curve is the marginal cost of production, which intersects the facility's average variable (avoidable) cost curve (AVC) and its average total cost curve (ATC) at their respective minimum points. The supply function is that portion of the marginal cost curve bounded by the minimum economically feasible production rate ( $q^m$ ) and the technical capacity ( $q^M$ ). A profit-maximizing producer will select the output rate where marginal revenue equals price, that is, at  $[P^*, q^*]$ . If market price falls below ATC,




**Figure A-2. Product Supply Function at Facility**

then the firm's best response is to cease production because total revenue does not cover total costs of production.

Now consider the effect of the regulation and the associated compliance costs. These fall into one of two categories: avoidable variable and avoidable nonvariable. These final costs are characterized as avoidable because a firm can choose to cease operation of the facility and, thus, avoid incurring the costs of compliance. The variable control costs include the operating and maintenance costs of the controls, while the nonvariable costs include compliance capital equipment. Figure A-3 illustrates the effect of these additional costs on the facility supply function. The facility's AVC and MC curves shift upward (to  $AVC'$  and  $MC'$ ) by the per-unit variable compliance costs. In addition, the nonvariable compliance costs increase total avoidable costs and, thus, the vertical distance between  $ATC'$  and  $AVC'$ . The facility's supply curve shifts upward with marginal costs and the new (higher) minimum operating level ( $q$ ) is determined by a new (higher)  $p_s$ .


Next consider the effect of compliance costs on the derived demand for inputs at the regulated facility. Integrated iron and steel mills are market demanders of furnace coke, while foundries with cupola furnaces are market demanders of foundry coke. We employ similar neoclassical analysis to that above to demonstrate the effect of the regulation on the demand for market coke inputs, both furnace and foundry. Figure A-4 illustrates the derived



**Figure A-3. Effect of Compliance Costs on Product Supply Function at Facility**

demand curve for coke inputs. Each point on the derived demand curve equals the willingness to pay for the corresponding marginal input. This is typically referred to as the input's value of marginal product (VMP), which is equal to the price of the output ( $P$ ) less the per-unit compliance cost ( $c$ ) times the input's "marginal physical product" (MPP), which is the incremental output attributable to the incremental inputs. If, as assumed in this analysis, the input-output relationship between the market coke input and the final product (steel mill products or iron castings) is strictly fixed, then the VMP of the market coke is constant and the derived demand curve is horizontal with the constant VMP as the vertical intercept, as shown in Figure A-4. Ignoring any effect on the output price for now, an increase in regulatory costs will lower the VMP of all inputs leading to a downward shift in the derived demand in Figure A-4 from  $D_y$  to  $D_y^1$ .






**Figure A-4. Derived Demand Curve for Coke Inputs**


### ***A.2.2 Market Effects***

To evaluate the market impacts, the economic analysis assumes that prices and quantities are determined in a competitive market (i.e., individual facilities have negligible power over the market price and thus take the price as “given” by the market). As shown in Figure A-5(a), under perfect competition, market prices and quantities are determined by the intersection of market supply and demand curves. The initial baseline scenario consists of a market price and quantity ( $P$ ,  $Q$ ) that is determined by the downward-sloping market demand curve ( $D^M$ ) and the upward-sloping market supply curve ( $S^M$ ) that reflects the horizontal summation of the individual producers’ supply curves.

Now consider the effect of the regulation on the baseline scenario as shown in Figure A-5(b). In the baseline scenario without the standards, at the projected price,  $P$ , the industry would produce total output,  $Q$ , with affected facilities producing the amount  $q_a$  and unaffected facilities accounting for  $Q$  minus  $q_a$ , or  $q_u$ . The regulation raises the production costs at affected facilities, causing their supply curves to shift upward from  $S_a$  to  $S_a'$  and the market supply curve to shift upward to  $S^{M'}$ . At the new with-regulation equilibrium with the regulation, the market price increases from  $P$  to  $P'$  and market output



**a) Baseline Equilibrium**



**b) With-Regulation Equilibrium**



**Figure A-5. Market Equilibrium without and with Regulation**

(as determined from the market demand curve,  $D^M$ ) declines from  $Q$  to  $Q'$ . This reduction in market output is the net result from reductions at affected facilities and increases at unaffected facilities. Unaffected facilities do not incur the increased costs due to regulation so their response to higher product prices is to increase production. Foreign suppliers (i.e., imports), which also do not face higher costs, will respond in the same manner as these unaffected producers.

The above description is typical of the expected market effects for final product markets. The regulations would potentially affect the costs of producing steel mill products through additional control costs and increases in the market price of furnace coke and the cost of producing captive furnace coke. The increase in control costs, the market price, and captive production costs for furnace coke result in an upward shift in the supply functions of integrated iron and steel mills, while nonintegrated and foreign suppliers are unaffected. Additionally, the regulations would potentially affect the costs of producing iron castings through additional control costs and changes in the market price of foundry coke. This results in an upward shift in supply functions of foundries operating cupola furnaces, while foundries operating electric furnaces are only affected to the extent they are subject to additional control costs.

However, there are additional impacts on the furnace and foundry coke markets related to their derived demand as inputs to either the production of steel mill products or iron castings. Figure A-6 illustrates, under perfect competition, the baseline scenario where the market quantity and price of the final steel mill product or iron casting,  $Q_x(Q_{x0}, P_{x0})$ , are determined by the intersection of the market demand curve ( $D_x$ ) and the market supply curve ( $S_x$ ), and the market quantity and price of furnace or foundry coke,  $Q_y(Q_{y0}, P_{y0})$ , are determined by the intersection of the market demand curve ( $D_y$ ) and market supply curve ( $S_y$ ). Given the derived demand for coke, the demanders of coke,  $Q_y$ , are the individual facilities that purchase coke for producing their final products (i.e., integrated steel mills in the case of furnace coke or foundries with cupola furnaces in the case of foundry coke).

Imposing the regulations increases the costs of producing coke and, thus, the final product, shifting the market supply functions for both commodities upward to  $S'_x$  and  $S'_y$ , respectively. The supply shift in the final product market causes the market quantity to fall to  $Q_{x1}$  and the market price to rise to  $P_{x1}$  in the new equilibrium. In the market for coke, the reduced production of the final product causes a downward shift in the demand curve ( $D_y$ ) with an unambiguous reduction in coke production, but the direction of the change in market



**Figure A-6. Market Equilibria With and Without Compliance Costs**

price is determined by the relative magnitude of the demand and supply shift. If the downward demand effect dominates, the price will fall (e.g.,  $P_{y1}$ ); however, if the upward supply effect dominates, the price will rise (e.g.,  $P_{y2}$ ). Otherwise, if the effects just offset each other, the price remains unchanged (e.g.,  $P_{y3} = P_{y0}$ ).

### ***A.2.3 Facility-Level Responses to Compliance Costs and New Market Prices***

In evaluating the market effects, we must distinguish between the initial effect of the regulations and the net effect after all markets have adjusted. The profit-maximizing behavior of firms, as described above, may lead to changes in output that, when aggregated across all producers, lead to changes in the market-clearing price and feedback on the firms to alter their decisions. These adjustments are characterized as a simultaneous interaction of producers, consumers, and markets. Thus, to evaluate the facility-market outcomes, the analysis must go beyond the initial effect of the regulation and estimate the net effect after markets have fully adjusted.

Given changes in the market prices and costs, each facility will elect to either

- continue to operate, adjusting production and input use based on new revenues and costs, or
- cease production at the facility if total revenues do not exceed total costs.

This decision can be extended to those facilities with multiple product lines or operations (e.g., coke batteries, blast furnaces, cupolas). If product revenues are less than product-specific costs, then these product-lines or operations may be closed.

Therefore, after accounting for the facility-market interaction, the operating decisions at each individual facility can be derived. These operating decisions include whether to continue to operate the facility (i.e., closure) and, if so, the optimal production level based on compliance costs and new market prices. The approach to modeling the facility closure decision is based on conventional microeconomic theory. This approach compares the ATC—which includes all cost components that fall to zero when production discontinues—to the expected post-regulatory price. Figure A-3 illustrates this comparison. If price falls below the ATC, total revenue would be less than the total costs. In this situation, the owner's cost-minimizing response is to close the facility. Therefore, as long as there is some return to the fixed factors of production—that is, some positive level of profits—the firm is expected to continue to operate the facility.

If the firm decides to continue operations, then the facility's decision turns to the optimal output rate. Facility and product-line closures, of course, directly translate into reductions in output. However, the output of facilities that continue to operate will also change depending on the relative impact of compliance costs and higher market prices. Increases in costs will tend to reduce producers' output rates; however, some of this effect is mitigated when prices are increased. If the market price increase more than offsets the increase in unit costs, then even some affected facilities could respond by increasing their production. Similarly, supply from unaffected domestic producers and foreign sources will respond positively to changes in market prices.

### **A.3 Operational Economic Model**

Implementation of the MACT standards will affect the costs of production for plants across the United States subject to the rule. Responses at the facility-level to these additional costs will collectively determine the market impacts of the rule. Specifically, the cost of the regulation may induce some facilities to alter their current level of production or to cease operations. These choices affect and, in turn are affected by, the market price of each product. As described above, the Agency has employed standard microeconomic concepts to model the supply and demand of each product and the impacts of the regulation on production costs and the output decisions of facilities. The main elements of the analysis are to

- characterize production of each product at the individual supplier and market levels,
- characterize the demand for each product, and
- develop the solution algorithm to determine the new with-regulation equilibrium.

The following sections provide the supply and demand specifications for each product market as implemented in the EIA model and summarize the model's solution algorithm. Supply and demand elasticities used in the model are presented in Table A-1.

#### ***A.3.1 Furnace Coke Market***

The market for furnace coke consists of supply from domestic coke plants, both merchant and captive, and foreign imports and of demand from integrated steel mills and foreign exports. The domestic supply for furnace coke is modeled as a stepwise supply function developed from the marginal cost of production at individual furnace coke batteries. The domestic demand is derived from iron and steel production at integrated mills as

**Table A-1. Supply and Demand Elasticities Used in Analysis**

Market	Supply Elasticity	Demand Elasticity
<i>Furnace Coke</i>		
Domestic	2.1 <sup>a</sup>	Derived demand
Foreign	3.0 <sup>b</sup>	−0.3 <sup>b</sup>
<i>Foundry Coke</i>		
Domestic	1.1 <sup>a</sup>	Derived demand
Foreign	3.0 <sup>b</sup>	−0.3 <sup>b</sup>
<i>Steel Mill Products</i>		
Domestic	3.5 <sup>c</sup>	−0.59 <sup>d</sup>
Foreign	1.5 <sup>c</sup>	−1.25 <sup>e</sup>
<i>Iron Castings</i>		
Domestic	1.0 <sup>f</sup>	−0.58 <sup>d</sup>
Foreign	1.0 <sup>f</sup>	−1.0 <sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Estimate based on individual battery production costs and output.

<sup>b</sup> Graham, Thorpe, and Hogan (1999).

<sup>c</sup> U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC). 2001a. Memorandum to the Commission from Craig Thomsen, John Giamalua, John Benedetto, and Joshua Level, International Economists. Investigation No. TA-201-73: STEEL—Remedy Memorandum. November 21, 2001.

<sup>d</sup> Econometric analysis (see Appendixes C and D for details).

<sup>e</sup> Ho, M., and D. Jorgenson. 1998. “Modeling Trade Policies and U.S. Growth: Some Methodological Issues.” Presented at USITC Conference on Evaluating APEC Trade Liberalization: Tariff and Nontariff Barriers. September 11-12, 1997.

<sup>f</sup> Assumed value.

determined through the market for steel mill products and coking rates for individual batteries. The following section details the market supply and demand components for this analysis.

#### *A.3.1.1 Market Supply of Furnace Coke*

The market supply for furnace coke,  $Q^{Sc}$ , is the sum of coke production from merchant facilities, excess production from captive facilities (coke produced at captive batteries less coke consumed for internal production on steel mill products), and foreign imports, i.e.,

$$Q^{Sc} = q_M^{Sc} + q_I^{Sc} + q_F^{Sc} \quad (A.1)$$

where

$q_M^{Sc}$  = furnace coke supply from merchant plants,

$q_I^{Sc}$  = furnace coke supply from integrated steel mills, and

$q_F^{Sc}$  = furnace coke supply from foreign sources (imports).

*Supply from Merchant and Captive Coke Plants.* The domestic supply of furnace coke is composed of the supply from merchant and captive coke plants reflecting plant-level production decisions for individual coke batteries. For merchant coke plants the supply is characterized as

$$q_M^{Sc} = \sum_l \sum_j q_{M(l,j)}^{Sc} \quad (A.2)$$

where

$q_M^{Sc}$  = supply of foundry coke from coke battery (j) at merchant plant (l).

Alternatively, for captive coke plants the supply is characterized as the furnace coke production remaining after internal coke requirements are satisfied for production of final steel mill products, i.e.,

$$q_I^{SE} = \text{MAX} \left[ \sum_l \left( \sum_j q_{I(l,j)}^{Sc} - r_{I(l)}^S q_{I(l)}^{Ss} \right), 0 \right] \quad (A.3)$$

where

$q_{I(l,j)}^{Sc}$  = the furnace coke production from captive battery (j) at integrated steel mill (l);



$r_{I(l)}^s$  = the coke rate for integrated steel mill (l), which specifies the amount of furnace coke input per unit of final steel mill product;<sup>1</sup> and

$q_{I(l)}^{ss}$  = supply of steel mill product from integrated mill (l).




The MAX function in Eq. (A.3) indicates that if the total captive production of furnace coke at an integrated mill is greater than the amount of furnace coke consumption required to produce steel mill products, then supply to the furnace coke market will equal the difference; otherwise, the mill's supply to the furnace coke market will be zero (i.e., it only satisfies internal requirements from its captive operations).

As stated above, the domestic supply of furnace coke is developed from plant-level production decisions for individual coke batteries. For an individual coke battery the marginal cost was assumed to be constant. Thus, merchant batteries supply 100 percent of a battery's capacity to the market if the battery's marginal cost (MC) is below the market price for furnace coke ( $p_c$ ), or zero if MC exceeds  $p_c$ . Captive batteries first supply the furnace coke demanded by their internal steelmaking requirements. Any excess capacity will then supply the furnace coke market if the remaining captive battery's MC is below the market price.

Marginal cost curves were developed for all furnace coke batteries at merchant and captive plants in the United States as detailed in Appendix B. Production costs for a single battery are characterized by constant marginal cost throughout the capacity range of the battery. This yields the inverted L-shaped supply function shown in Figure A-7(a). In this case, marginal cost (MC) equals average variable cost (AVC) and is constant up to the production capacity given by  $q$ . The supply function becomes vertical at  $q$  because increasing production beyond this point is not possible. The minimum economically achievable price level is equal to  $p^*$ . Below this price level,  $p^*$  is less than AVC, and the supplier would choose to shut down rather than to continue to produce coke.

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<sup>1</sup>The furnace coke rate for each integrated steel mill is taken from Hogan and Koelble (1996). The coke rate is assumed to be constant with respect to the quantity of finished steel products produced at a given mill. A constant coke rate at each integrated mill implies a constant efficiency of use at all output levels and substitution possibilities do not exist given the technology in place at integrated mills. Furthermore, the initial captive share of each integrated mill's coke requirement is based on the baseline data from the EPA estimates.



**Figure A-7. Facility-Level Supply Functions for Coke**

A stepwise supply function can be created for each facility with multiple batteries by ordering production from least to highest MC batteries (see Figure A-7[b]). For captive coke plants, the lowest cost batteries are assumed to supply internal demand, leaving the higher cost battery(ies) to supply the market if  $MC < P$  for the appropriate battery(ies). Similarly, a stepwise aggregate domestic supply function can be created by ordering production from least to highest MC batteries (see Figure A-7(c)). Based on this characterization of domestic supply, a decrease in demand for furnace coke would then sequentially close batteries beginning with the highest MC battery.

*Foreign Supply of Furnace Coke.* Foreign supply of furnace coke ( $q_F^{Sc}$ ) is expressed as

$$q_F^{Sc} = A_F^c (p^c)^{\xi_F^c} \quad (A.4)$$

where

$A_F^c$  = multiplicative parameter for the foreign furnace coke supply equation, and

$\xi_F^c$  = foreign supply elasticity for furnace coke.

The multiplicative parameter ( $A_F^c$ ) calibrates the foreign coke supply equation to replicate the observed 2000 level of furnace coke imports based on the market price and the foreign supply elasticity.

#### A.3.1.2 Market Demand for Furnace Coke

Market demand for furnace coke ( $Q^{Dc}$ ) is the sum of domestic demand from integrated steel mills and foreign demand (exports), i.e.,

$$Q^{Dc} = q_I^{Dc} + q_F^{Dc} \quad (A.5)$$

where

$q_I^{Dc}$  = derived demand of furnace coke from integrated steel mills, and

$q_F^{Dc}$  = foreign demand of furnace coke (exports).

*Domestic Demand for Furnace Coke.* Integrated steel mills use furnace coke as an input to the production of finished steel products. Furnace coke demand is derived from the final product supply decisions at the integrated steel mills. Once these final production decisions of integrated producers have been made, the mill-specific coke input rate will determine their individual coke requirements. Integrated steel mills satisfy their internal requirements first through captive operations and second through market purchases. Thus, the derived demand for furnace coke is the difference between total furnace coke required and the captive capacity at integrated plants, i.e.,

$$q_I^{Dc} = \text{MAX} \left[ \sum_l \left( r_{I(l)}^s q_{I(l)}^{ss} - \sum_j q_{I(l,j)}^{sc} \right), 0 \right] \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$r_{I(l)}^s$  = the coke rate for integrated steel mill (l), which specifies the amount of furnace coke input per unit of final steel mill product;

$q_{I(l)}^{ss}$  = supply of steel mill product from integrated mill (l); and

$q_{I(l,j)}^{sc}$  = the furnace coke production from captive battery (j) at integrated steel mill (l).

The MAX function in Eq. (A.3) indicates that if the amount of furnace coke consumption required by an integrated mill to produce steel mill products is greater than its total captive production, then demand from the furnace coke market will equal the difference; otherwise, the mill's demand from the furnace coke market will be zero (i.e., it fully satisfies internal requirements from its captive operations).

Increases in the price for furnace coke will increase the per-unit costs of final steel products and thereby shift upward the integrated mill's supply curve for steel mill products. The shift in the supply curve decreases the market quantity of finished steel products produced, which subsequently reduces the quantity of furnace coke consumed at integrated mills and shifts their demand curve downward in the furnace coke market.

*Foreign Demand for Furnace Coke (Exports).* Foreign demand for furnace coke is expressed as

$$q_F^{Dc} = B_F^c (p^c)^{\eta_F^c} \quad (A.7)$$

where

$B_F^c$  = multiplicative demand parameter for the foreign furnace coke demand equation, and

$\eta_F^c$  = foreign demand elasticity for furnace coke.

The multiplicative demand parameter,  $B_F^c$ , calibrates the foreign coke demand equation to replicate the observed 2000 level of foreign exports based on the market price and the foreign demand elasticity.

### ***A.3.2 Market for Steel Mill Products***

The market for steel mill products consists of supply from domestic mills and foreign imports and of demand from domestic and foreign consumers. Steel mill products are modeled as a single commodity market. The domestic supply for steel mill products includes production from integrated mills operating blast furnaces that require furnace coke and from nonintegrated mills that operate electric arc furnaces that do not. The coke oven NESHAP is expected to increase the cost of furnace coke inputs. In addition, the integrated iron and steel NESHAP will also increase the costs of production leading to similar impacts. This will increase the cost of production at integrated mills and thereby shift their supply curves upward and increase the price of steel mill products.

#### ***A.3.2.1 Market Supply of Steel Mill Products***

The market supply for steel mill products ( $Q^{Ss}$ ) is defined as the sum of the supply from integrated iron and steel mills, nonintegrated mills, and foreign imports, i.e.,

$$Q^{Ss} = q_I^{Ss} + q_{NI}^{Ss} + q_F^{Ss} \quad (A.8)$$

where

$q_I^{Ss}$  = supply of steel mill products from integrated mills;

$q_{NI}^{Ss}$  = supply of steel mill products from the nonintegrated steel mills; and

$q_F^{ss}$  = supply of steel mill products from foreign suppliers (imports).

*Supply from Integrated Mills.* Supply of steel mill products from integrated iron and steel mills is the sum of individual mill production, i.e.,

$$q_I^{ss} = \sum_l q_{I(l)}^{ss} \quad (A.9)$$

where

$q_{I(l)}^{ss}$  = quantity of steel mill products produced at an individual integrated mill (l).

Integrated producers of steel mill products vary output as production costs change. As described above, upward-sloping supply curves were used to model integrated mills' responses. For this analysis, the generalized Leontief technology is assumed to characterize the production of steel mill products at each facility. This technology is appropriate, given the fixed-proportion material input of coke and the variable-proportion inputs of labor, energy, and raw materials. The generalized Leontief supply function is

$$q_{I(l)}^{ss} = \gamma_l + \frac{\beta}{2} \left( \frac{1}{p_s} \right)^{\frac{1}{2}} \quad (A.10)$$


where  $p_s$  is the market price for the steel product,  $\gamma_l$  and  $\beta$  are model parameters, and l indexes affected integrated mills. The theoretical restrictions on the model parameters that ensure upward-sloping supply curves are  $\gamma_l > 0$  and  $\beta < 0$ .

Figure A-8 illustrates the theoretical supply function of Eq. (A.6). As shown, the upward-sloping supply curve is specified over a productive range with a lower bound of zero

that corresponds with a shutdown price equal to  $\frac{\beta^2}{4\gamma_l^2}$  and an upper bound given by the

productive capacity of  $q_I^M$  that is approximated by the supply parameter  $\gamma_l$ . The curvature of the supply function is determined by the  $\beta$  parameter.

To specify the supply function of Eq. (A.6) for this analysis, the  $\beta$  parameter was computed by substituting a market supply elasticity for the product ( $\xi$ ), the market price of the product ( $p$ ), and the average annual production level across mills ( $q$ ) into the following equation:



**Figure A-8. Theoretical Supply Function for Integrated Facilities and Foundries**

$$\beta = -\xi 4q \left[ \frac{1}{p_s} \right]^{-\frac{1}{2}} \quad (\text{A.11})$$

The  $\beta$  parameter was calculated by incorporating market price and elasticity of supply values into Eq. (A.11).

The intercept of the supply function,  $\gamma_i$ , approximates the productive capacity and varies across products at each facility. This parameter does not influence the facility's production responsiveness to price changes as does the  $\beta$  parameter. Thus, the parameter  $\gamma_i$  is used to calibrate the economic model so that each individual facility's supply equation matches its baseline production data from 2000.

*Modeling the Impact of Compliance Costs.* The effect of coke oven NESHAP is to increase the MC of producing furnace coke by the compliance costs. These costs include the variable component consisting of the operating and maintenance costs and the nonvariable component consisting of the control equipment required for the regulatory option. Regulatory control costs will shift the supply curve upward for each affected facility by the

annualized compliance cost (operating and maintenance plus annualized capital) expressed per unit of coke production. Computing the supply shift in this way treats compliance costs as the conceptual equivalent of a unit tax on output. For coke facilities, the horizontal portion of its supply curve will rise by the per-unit total compliance costs. In this case, the MC curve will shift by this amount to allow the new higher reservation price for the coke battery to appropriately reflect the fixed costs of compliance in the operating decision. At a multiple-battery facility, the change in each battery's MC may cause a reordering of the steps because the compliance costs vary due to the technology, age, and existing controls of individual batteries.

Compliance costs on captive furnace coke batteries will directly affect production decisions at integrated mills, while compliance costs on merchant furnace coke batteries will indirectly affect these decisions through the change in the market price of furnace coke. In addition, direct compliance costs associated with the integrated iron and steel NESHAP will directly affect production decisions at these mills. Both of these impacts were modeled as reducing the net price integrated mills receive for steel mill products. Returning to the integrated mill's supply function presented in Eq. (A.10), the mill's production quantity with compliance costs is expressed as

$$q_{I(1)}^s = \gamma_1 + \frac{\beta}{2} \left[ \frac{1}{p_s - r \frac{s}{I(1)} [\alpha_1 \Delta c_1^c + (1-\alpha_1) \Delta p_c] - c_1^s} \right] \quad (A.12)$$

where

$r_{I(1)}^s$  = the coke rate for integrated steel mill (1), which specifies the amount of furnace coke input per unit of steel mill product;

$\alpha_1$  = the share of integrated steel mill 1's furnace coke provided by captive batteries;

$\Delta c_1^c$  = change in per-unit cost of captive coke production at integrated steel mill 1;

$(1-\alpha_1)$  = share of integrated steel mill 1's furnace coke provided by the market;

$\Delta p_c$  = change in the market price for furnace coke; and



$\Delta c_1^s$  = change in per-unit compliance cost at integrated steel mill 1.

The bracketed term in the denominator represents the increased costs due to the coke ovens NESHAP and integrated iron and steel NESHAP, i.e., both the direct and indirect effects. The coke oven NESHAP compliance costs,  $\Delta c_1^c$  and  $\Delta p_c$ , are expressed per ton of furnace coke and weighted to reflect each integrated mill's reliance on captive versus market furnace coke.<sup>2</sup> The change in the cost per ton of furnace coke due to the regulation is then multiplied by the mill's coke rate to obtain the change in the cost per ton of steel mill product. The integrated iron and steel NESHAP compliance costs  $\Delta c_1^s$  are also expressed in cost per ton of steel mill product. These changes in the cost per ton of steel mill product correspond to the shift in the affected facility supply curve shown in Figure A-5b.

*Supply from Nonintegrated Mills.* The supply of steel mill products from domestic nonintegrated mills is specified as

$$q_{NI}^{ss} = A_{NI}^s (p^s)^{\xi_{NI}^s} \quad (A.13)$$

where

$A_{NI}^s$  = multiplicative parameter for nonintegrated mill supply equation, and

$\xi_{NI}^s$  = the nonintegrated mill supply elasticity for finished steel products.

The multiplicative supply parameter is determined by backsolving Eq. (A.8), given baseline values of the market price, supply elasticities, and quantities supplied by nonintegrated mills and foreign mills.

*Foreign Supply (Imports).* The supply of steel mill products from foreign suppliers (imports) is specified as

$$q_F^{ss} = A_F^s (p^s)^{\xi_F^s} \quad (A.14)$$

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<sup>2</sup>The captive versus market furnace coke weights are endogenous in the model because integrated mills exhaust their captive supply of coke first; hence, changes in coke consumption typically come from changes in market purchases, while captive consumption remains relatively constant.

where

$A_F^s$  = multiplicative parameter for foreign supply equation, and

$\xi_F^s$  = the foreign supply elasticity for finished steel products (assumed value = 1).

The multiplicative supply parameters are determined by backsolving Eq. (A.8), given baseline values of the market price, supply elasticity, and level of imports.

#### A.3.2.2 Market Demand for Steel Mill Products

The market demand for steel mill products,  $Q^{Ds}$ , is the sum of domestic and foreign demand, i.e.,

$$Q^{Ds} = q_D^{Ds} + q_F^{Ds} \quad (A.15)$$

where

$q_D^{Ds}$  = domestic demand for steel mill products, and

$q_F^{Ds}$  = foreign demand for steel mill products (exports).

*Domestic Demand for Steel Mill Products.* The domestic demand for steel mill products is expressed as

$$q_D^{Ds} = B_D^s (p^s)^{\eta_D^s} \quad (A.16)$$

where

$B_D^s$  = multiplicative parameter for domestic steel mill products demand equation,  
and

$\eta_D^s$  = domestic demand elasticity for steel mill products.

The multiplicative demand parameter calibrates the domestic demand equation given baseline data on price and demand elasticity to replicate the observed 2000 level of domestic consumption.

*Foreign Demand for Steel Mill Products (Exports).* Foreign demand (exports) for steel mill products is expressed as

$$q_F^{Ds} = B_F^s (p^s)^{\eta_F^s} \quad (A.17)$$

where

$B_F^s$  = multiplicative demand parameter for foreign steel mill products' demand equation, and

$\eta_F^s$  = foreign (export) demand elasticity for steel mill products.

The multiplicative demand parameter calibrates the foreign demand equation given data on price and demand elasticities to replicate the observed 2000 level of foreign exports.

### ***A.3.3 Market for Foundry Coke***

The market for furnace coke consists of supply from domestic merchant coke plants and imports and demand from foundries operating cupola furnaces. The domestic supply for foundry coke is modeled as a stepwise supply function developed from the marginal cost of production at individual foundry coke batteries. Imports are modeled using a representative supply curve. The domestic demand is derived from iron castings production at foundries operating cupola furnaces (domestic and foreign) as determined through the market for iron castings and coking rates. The following section details the market supply and demand components for this analysis.

#### ***A.3.3.1 Market Supply of Foundry Coke***

The market supply of foundry coke,  $Q^{Sk}$ , is composed of the supply from domestic merchant plants reflecting plant-level production decisions for individual merchant coke batteries, and a single representative foreign supply curve, i.e.,

$$Q^{Sk} = q_M^{Sk} + q_F^{Sk} = \sum_l \sum_j q_{M(l,j)}^{Sk} + q_F^{Sk} \quad (A.18)$$

where

$l$  = plants

j = batteries

$q_{M(l,j)}^{sk}$  = supply of foundry coke from coke battery (j) at merchant plant (l)

$q_F^{sk}$  = foundry coke supply from imports

As was the case for furnace coke batteries, the marginal cost for an individual foundry coke battery is assumed to be constant reflecting a fixed-coefficient technology. Marginal cost curves were developed for all foundry coke batteries at merchant plants in the United States as detailed in Appendix B.

Foundry coke production decisions are based on the same approach used to model furnace coke production decisions. Thus, as illustrated previously in Figure A-7, the production decision is determined by an inverted L-shaped supply curve that is perfectly elastic to the capacity level of production and perfectly inelastic thereafter. Foundry coke batteries will supply 100 percent of capacity if its marginal cost is less than market price; otherwise, it will cease production. The regulatory costs shift each affected battery's marginal cost upward, affecting facilities' decision to operate or shut down individual batteries.

*Foreign Supply of Foundry Coke.* Foreign supply of foundry coke ( $q_F^{sk}$ ) is expressed as

$$q_F^{sk} = A_F^k (p^k)^{\xi_F^k} \quad (A.19)$$

where

$A_F^k$  = multiplicative parameter for the foreign foundry coke supply equation, and

$\xi_F^k$  = foreign supply elasticity for foundry coke.

The multiplicative parameter ( $A_F^k$ ) calibrates the foreign coke supply equation to replicate the observed 2000 level of foundry coke imports based on the market price and the foreign supply elasticity.

### A.3.3.2 Market Demand for Foundry Coke

The market demand for foundry coke,  $Q^{Dk}$ , is composed of domestic and foreign demand by foundries operating cupola furnaces. Therefore, the foundry coke demand is derived from the production of iron castings from cupola furnaces. Increases in the price of foundry coke due to the regulation will lead to decreases in production of iron castings at foundries operating cupola furnaces. The demand function for foundry coke is expressed as follows:

where

$$Q^{Dk} = q_{CF}^{Dk} + q_{CFF}^{Dk} = r_{CF}^i q_{CF}^{Si} + q_{CFF}^{Dk} \quad (A.20)$$

$q_{CF}^{Dk}$  = derived demand for foundry coke from domestic cupola foundries;

$q_{CFF}^{Dk}$  = demand for foundry coke from foreign cupola foundries;

$r_{CF}^i$  = the coke rate for cupola foundries, which specifies the amount of foundry coke input per unit output; and

$q_{CF}^{Si}$  = quantity of iron castings produced at domestic cupola foundries;

Changes in production at foundries using electric arc and electric induction furnaces to produce iron castings do not affect the demand for foundry coke.

*Foreign Demand for Foundry Coke (Exports).* Foreign demand for foundry coke is expressed as

$$q_F^{Dk} = B_F^k (p^k)^{\eta_F^k} \quad (A.21)$$

where

$B_F^k$  = multiplicative demand parameter for the foreign foundry coke demand equation, and

$\eta_F^k$  = foreign demand elasticity for foundry coke.

The multiplicative demand parameter,  $B_F^k$ , calibrates the foreign coke demand equation to replicate the observed 2000 level of foreign exports based on the market price and the foreign demand elasticity.

#### ***A.3.4 Market for Iron Castings***

The market for iron castings consists of supply from domestic foundries and foreign imports and of demand from domestic and foreign consumers. Iron castings are modeled as a single commodity market. The domestic supply for iron castings includes production from foundries operating cupola furnaces that require foundry coke and from foundries that operate electric furnaces that do not. The rule is expected to increase production costs for selected cupola and electric foundries and thereby shift their supply curves upward and increase the price of iron castings.

##### ***A.3.4.1 Market Supply of Iron Castings***

The market supply for iron castings,  $Q^{Si}$ , is defined as the sum of the supply from domestic and foreign foundries. Domestic foundries are further segmented into operations using foundry coke (referred to as cupola foundries) and operations using electric furnaces (referred to as electric foundries). Supply is expressed as a function of the market price for castings:

$$Q^{Si} = q_{CF}^{Si} + q_{EF}^{Si} + q_F^{Si} \quad (A.22)$$

where

$q_{CF}^{Si}$  = quantity of iron castings produced at domestic cupola foundries,

$q_{EF}^{Si}$  = supply from domestic electric foundries, and

$q_F^{Si}$  = supply from foreign foundries.

*Domestic Foundries with Cupola Furnaces.* The Agency used a simple supply function to characterize the production of iron castings. Compliance costs on foundry coke will directly affect cupola foundries' production decisions and indirectly affect these decisions through the changes in the market price of foundry coke. This impact is modeled as reducing the net revenue cupola foundries receive for the sales of iron castings. Each directly affected cupola foundry's supply function is expressed as

$$q_{CF_1}^{Si} = A_{CF_1}^i (p^i - \phi_1^i r_{CF_1}^i \Delta p^k - \Delta c_1)^{\xi_{CF}^i} \quad (A.23)$$

where

$A_{CF_1}^i$  = multiplicative supply parameter for foundry 1's supply equation,

$\phi_1$  = share of foundry 1's iron castings produced using cupola furnaces,

$r_{CF_1}^i$  = the coke rate for cupola furnaces, which specifies the amount of foundry coke input per unit output (0.2493),

$\Delta p^k$  = change in the market price for foundry coke,

$\Delta c_1$  = change in per-unit cost of iron casting production, and

$\xi_{CF}^i$  = supply elasticity for iron castings.

The multiplicative supply parameter,  $A_{CF}^i$ , is determined by backsolving Eq. (A.23), given baseline values of the market price, supply elasticity, and quantity supplied. Unaffected iron casting output produced with cupola furnaces are modeled as a single representative cupola foundry.

*Domestic Electric Furnace Foundries.* The functional form of the supply curve for directly affected domestic foundries with electric arc or induction furnaces is specified as

$$q_{EF_1}^{Si} = A_{EF_1}^i (p^i - \Delta c_1)^{\xi_{EF}^i} \quad (A.24)$$

where

$A_{EF}^i$  = multiplicative parameter for electric foundries supply equation, and

$\Delta c_1$  = change in per-unit cost of iron casting production, and

$\xi_{EF}^i$  = electric foundries supply elasticity for iron castings.

The multiplicative supply parameter,  $A_{EF}^i$ , is determined by backsolving Eq. (A.24), given baseline values of the market price, supply elasticity, and quantity supplied from electric foundries. Unaffected iron casting output produced with electric furnaces are modeled as a single representative electric foundry.

*Foreign Supply (Imports).* The functional form of the foreign supply curve for iron castings is specified as

$$q_F^{Si} = A_F^i (p^i)^{\xi_F^i} \quad (A.25)$$

where

$A_F^i$  = multiplicative parameter for foreign iron castings supply equation, and

$\xi_F^i$  = foreign supply elasticity for iron castings.

The multiplicative supply parameter,  $A_F^i$ , is determined by backsolving Eq. (A.25), given baseline values of the market price, supply elasticity, and level of imports.

#### A.3.4.2 Market Demand for Iron Castings

The market demand for iron castings ( $Q^{Di}$ ) is the sum of domestic and foreign demand, and it is expressed as a function of the price of iron castings:

$$Q^{Di} = q_D^{Di} + q_F^{Di} \quad (A.26)$$

where

$q_D^{Di}$  = domestic demand for iron castings, and

$q_F^{Di}$  = foreign demand (exports) for iron castings.

*Domestic Demand for Iron Castings.* The domestic demand for iron castings is expressed as

$$q_D^{Di} = B_D^i (p^i)^{\eta_D^i} \quad (A.27)$$



where

$B_D^i$  = multiplicative parameter for domestic iron castings' demand equation, and

$\eta_D^i$  = domestic demand elasticity for iron castings.

The multiplicative demand parameter calibrates the domestic demand equation given baseline data on price and demand elasticity to replicate the observed 2000 level of domestic consumption.

*Foreign Demand for Iron Castings.* Foreign demand (exports) for iron castings is expressed as

$$q_F^{Di} = B_F^i (p^i)^{\eta_F^i} \quad (A.28)$$

where

$B_F^i$  = multiplicative demand parameter for foreign iron castings' demand equation,  
and

$\eta_F^i$  = foreign (export) demand elasticity for iron castings.

The multiplicative demand parameter  $B_F^i$  is determined by backsolving Eq. (A.28), given baseline values of market price, demand elasticity, and level of exports.

#### ***A.3.5 Post-regulatory Market Equilibrium Determination***

Integrated steel mills and iron foundries with cupola furnaces must determine output given the market prices for their finished products, which in turn determines their furnace and foundry coke requirements. The optimal output of steel mill products at integrated mills also depends on the cost of producing captive furnace coke and the market price of furnace coke; whereas iron foundries with cupolas depend on only the market price of foundry coke because they have no captive operations. Excess production of captive furnace coke at integrated mills will spill over into the furnace coke market; whereas an excess demand will cause the mill to demand furnace coke from the market. For merchant coke plants, the optimal market supply of furnace and/or foundry coke will be determined by the market price of each coke product.

Facility responses and market adjustments can be conceptualized as an interactive feedback process. Facilities face increased costs from the regulation, which initially reduce output. The cumulative effect of these individual changes leads to an increase in the market price that all producers (affected and unaffected) and consumers face, which leads to further responses by producers (affected and unaffected) as well as consumers and thus new market prices, and so on. The new equilibrium after imposing the regulation is the result of a series of iterations between producer and consumer responses and market adjustments until a stable market price arises where market supply equals market demand for each product, i.e.,  $Q_s = Q_D$ .

The Agency employed a Walrasian auctioneer process to determine equilibrium price (and output) associated with the increased production costs of the regulation. The auctioneer calls out a market price for each product and evaluates the reactions by all participants (producers and consumers), comparing total quantities supplied and demanded to determine the next price that will guide the market closer to equilibrium (i.e., where market supply equals market demand). Decision rules are established to ensure that the process will converge to an equilibrium, in addition to specifying the conditions for equilibrium. The result of this approach is a vector of prices with the regulation that equilibrates supply and demand for each product.

The algorithm for deriving the with-regulation equilibria in all markets can be generalized to five recursive steps:

1. Impose the control costs for each affected facility, thereby affecting their supply decisions.
2. Recalculate the production decisions for coke products and both final steel mill products and iron castings across all affected facilities. The adjusted production of steel mill products from integrated steel mills and iron castings from foundries with cupola furnaces determines the derived demand for furnace and foundry coke through the input ratios. Therefore, the domestic demand for furnace and foundry coke is simultaneously determined with the domestic supply of final steel mill products and iron castings from these suppliers. After accounting for these adjustments, recalculate the market supply of all products by aggregating across all producers, affected and unaffected.
3. Determine the new prices via a price revision rule for all product markets.
4. Recalculate the supply functions of all facilities with the new prices, resulting in a new market supply of each product, in addition to derived (domestic) demand for furnace and foundry coke. Evaluate domestic demand for final steel mill products

and iron castings, as well as import supply and export demand for appropriate products given the new prices.


5. Go to Step #3, resulting in new prices for each product. Repeat until equilibrium conditions are satisfied in all markets (i.e., the ratio of supply to demand is approximately one for each and every product).

### ***A.3.6 Economic Welfare Impacts***


The economic welfare implications of the market price and output changes with the regulation can be examined using two slightly different tactics, each giving a somewhat different insight but the same implications: changes in the net benefits of consumers and producers based on the price changes and changes in the total benefits and costs of these products based on the quantity changes. This analysis focuses on the first measure—the changes in the net benefits of consumers and producers. Figure A-9 depicts the change in economic welfare by first measuring the change in consumer surplus and then the change in producer surplus. In essence, the demand and supply curves previously used as predictive devices are now being used as a valuation tool.

This method of estimating the change in economic welfare with the regulation divides society into consumers and producers. In a market environment, consumers and producers of the good or service derive welfare from a market transaction. The difference between the maximum price consumers are willing to pay for a good and the price they actually pay is referred to as “consumer surplus.” Consumer surplus is measured as the area under the demand curve and above the price of the product. Similarly, the difference between the minimum price producers are willing to accept for a good and the price they actually receive is referred to as “producer surplus” or profits. Producer surplus is measured as the area above the supply curve and below the price of the product. These areas can be thought of as consumers’ net benefits of consumption and producers’ net benefits of production, respectively.


In Figure A-9, baseline equilibrium occurs at the intersection of the demand curve,  $D$ , and supply curve,  $S$ . Price is  $P_1$  with quantity  $Q_1$ . The increased cost of production with the regulation will cause the market supply curve to shift upward to  $S'$ . The new equilibrium price of the product is  $P_2$ . With a higher price for the product, there is less consumer welfare, all else being unchanged as real incomes are reduced. In Figure A-9(a), area A represents the dollar value of the annual net loss in consumers’ benefits with the increased price. The rectangular portion represents the loss in consumer surplus on the quantity still consumed,



(a) Change in Consumer Surplus with Regulation



(b) Change in Producer Surplus with Regulation



(c) Net Change in Economic Welfare with Regulation

**Figure A-9. Economic Welfare Changes with Regulation: Consumer and Producer Surplus**

$Q_2$ , while the triangular area represents the foregone surplus resulting from the reduced quantity consumed,  $Q_1 - Q_2$ .

In addition to the changes in consumer welfare, producer welfare also changes with the regulation. With the increase in market price, producers receive higher revenues on the quantity still purchased,  $Q_2$ . In Figure A-9(b), area B represents the increase in revenues due to this increase in price. The difference in the area under the supply curve up to the original market price, area C, measures the loss in producer surplus, which includes the loss associated with the quantity no longer produced. The net change in producer welfare is represented by area B–C.

The change in economic welfare attributable to the compliance costs of the regulation is the sum of consumer and producer surplus changes, that is,  $-(A) + (B - C)$ . Figure A-9(c) shows the net (negative) change in economic welfare associated with the regulation as area D. However, this analysis does not include the benefits that occur outside the market (i.e., the value of the reduced levels of air pollution with the regulation). Including this benefit may reduce the net cost of the regulation or even make it positive.

## APPENDIX B

### DEVELOPMENT OF COKE BATTERY COST FUNCTIONS

This appendix outlines EPA's method for estimating 2000 baseline production costs for coke batteries. The Agency used a coke production cost model developed in support of the 1993 MACT on coke ovens. EPA's *Technical Approach for a Coke Production Cost Model* (EPA, 1979) provides a more detailed description of this model. For this analysis, the model was updated with reported technical characteristics of coke batteries from the Information Collection Request (ICR) survey responses and available price data (see Table B-1). In addition, the Agency incorporated estimates of MACT pollution abatement costs developed for the 1993 MACT on coke ovens (EPA, 1991).

#### B.1 Variable Costs

Coke batteries use four variable inputs during the manufacturing process—metallurgical coal, labor, energy, and other materials/supplies. Metallurgical coal is essentially the only raw material used in the production of coke. Labor transports and delivers the raw materials as well as final products. Coke ovens and auxiliary equipment consume energy and supplies during the production process and periodic maintenance and repair of the coke batteries.

Coke production requires a fixed amount of each variable input per ton of coke, and these inputs are not substitutable. Accordingly, the total variable cost function is linear in the output and input prices, or, in other words, the average variable cost function is independent of output. Therefore, the average variable cost function (expressed in dollars per short ton of coke) can be written as

$$AVC = AV\_CI \cdot P_c + AV\_LI \cdot w + AV\_EI \cdot P_e + AV\_OI \cdot P_o \quad (B.1)$$

where AV\_CI, AV\_LI, AV\_EI, and AV\_OI are the fixed requirements per ton of coke of metallurgical coal, labor, energy, and other material and supplies.  $P_c$ ,  $w$ ,  $P_e$ , and  $P_o$  are the prices of each variable input, respectively. As shown above, the contribution of each variable input to the per-unit coke cost is equal to the average variable input (fixed requirement of the input per ton of coke) times the price of the input. For example, the

**Table B-1. Key Parameter Updates for Coke Production Cost Model: 2000<sup>a</sup>**

Variable	Description	Units	2000
R1	Steam Cost	\$/1,000 lb steam	8.97
R2	Cooling Water	\$/1,000 gal	0.26
R3	Electricity	\$/kWh	Varies by state
R4	Underfire Gas	\$/10 <sup>3</sup> cft	1.06
R7	Calcium Hydroxide	\$/ton	74.00
R8	Sulfuric Acid	\$/ton	79.00
R9	Sodium Carbonate	\$/ton	537.00
R10	Sodium Hydroxide	\$/ton	315.00
R11	Coal Tar Credit	\$/gal	0.82
R12	Crude Light Oil	\$/gal	1.27
R13	BTX Credit	\$/gal	0.94
R14	Ammonium Sulfate Credit	\$/ton	40.04
R14*	Anhydrous Ammonia Credit	\$/ton	239.21
R15	Elemental Sulfur Credit	\$/ton	287.48
R16	Sodium Phenolate Credit	\$/ton	864.12
R17	Benzene Credit	\$/gal	1.21
R18	Toluene Credit	\$/gal	0.85
R19	Xylene Credit	\$/gal	0.75
R20	Naphthalene Credit	\$/lb	0.27
R21	Coke Breeze Credit	\$/ton	45.62
R22	Solvent Naptha Credit	\$/gal	0.88
R23	Wash Oil Cost	\$/gal	1.29
R25	Phosphoric Acid (commercial)	\$/ton	711.31
	Industrial Coke Price	\$/ton	112.00

<sup>a</sup>This table provides price update for the coke production cost model (EPA, 1979, Table 2–3).

contribution of labor to the cost per ton of coke (AV\_LI) is equal to the labor requirement per ton of coke times the price of labor (w).

The variable costs above include those costs associated with by- and co-product recovery operations associated with the coke battery. To more accurately reflect the costs specific to coke production, the Agency subtracted by- and co-product revenues/credits from Eq. (B.1). By-products include tar and coke oven gas among others, while co-products include coke breeze and other industrial coke. Following the same fixed coefficient

approach, these revenues or credits (expressed per ton of coke) are derived for each recovered product at the coke battery by multiplying the appropriate yield (recovered product per ton of coke) by its price or value. The variable cost components and by-/co-product credits are identified below.

### ***B.1.1 Metallurgical Coal ( $AVCI, P_c$ )***

The ICR survey responses provided the fixed input requirement for metallurgical coal at each battery. Based on the responses from the survey, U.S. coke producers require an average of 1.36 tons of coal per ton of coke produced. This fixed input varies by type of producer. Integrated, or captive, producers require an average of 1.38 tons of coal per ton of coke produced, while merchant producers require an average of 1.31 tons of coal per ton of coke produced. The U.S. Department of Energy provides state-level coal price data for metallurgical coal. For each coke battery, EPA computed the cost of coal per short ton of coke by multiplying its input ratio times the appropriate state or regional price. As shown in Table B-2, the average cost of metallurgical coal per ton of coke in 2000 was \$61.23 for captive producers and \$57.98 for merchant producers.

**Table B-2. Metallurgical Coal Costs by Producer Type: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	<b>Captive</b>	<b>Merchant</b>	<b>All Coke Batteries</b>
Number of batteries	40	18	58
Average	\$61.23	\$57.98	\$60.22
Minimum	\$56.21	\$52.17	\$52.17
Maximum	\$71.98	\$68.39	\$71.98

### ***B.1.2 Labor ( $AVLI, w$ )***

The cost model provides an estimate of the fixed labor requirement for operation, maintenance, and supervision labor at each battery. The Agency used these estimates to derive the average variable labor cost for each individual battery given its technical characteristics and the appropriate state-level wage rates obtained from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (2002). As shown in Table B-3, average labor costs per ton of coke are significantly lower for captive producers (e.g., \$17.18 per ton of coke) relative to merchant



**Table B-3. Labor Costs by Producer Type: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	Captive	Merchant	All Coke Batteries
Number of batteries	40	18	58
Average	\$17.18	\$28.95	\$20.83
Minimum	\$9.19	\$11.07	\$9.19
Maximum	\$38.35	\$44.63	\$44.63

producers (e.g., \$28.95 per ton of coke). Captive batteries are typically larger capacity batteries and therefore require fewer person-hours per ton of coke.

### ***B.1.3 Energy (AVEI, $P_e$ )***

The cost model estimates the fixed energy requirements (i.e., electricity, steam, and water) for each battery. These estimates are used to derive the energy costs per ton of coke for each battery. Captive producers have a lower electricity requirement (i.e., 47.58 kWh per ton of coke) relative to merchant producers (i.e., 50.96 kWh per ton of coke). As shown in Table B-4, the average energy cost per ton of coke across all coke batteries is \$5.77. Average energy costs per ton of coke are lower for captive producers (e.g., \$5.51 per ton of coke) relative to merchant producers (e.g., \$6.34 per ton of coke). This difference reflects lower state/regional electricity prices in regions where captive batteries produce coke.

**Table B-4. Energy Costs by Producer Type: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	Captive	Merchant	All Coke Batteries
Number of batteries	40	18	58
Average	\$5.51	\$6.34	\$5.77
Minimum	\$3.91	\$4.31	\$3.91
Maximum	\$16.11	\$15.41	\$16.11

#### ***B.1.4 Other Materials and Supplies (AVOI, $P_o$ )***

The fixed requirements for other materials and supplies associated with the production of coke include

- chemicals,
- maintenance materials,
- safety and clothing, and
- laboratory and miscellaneous supplies.

As shown in Table B-5, the cost model estimates the average cost for these items across all coke batteries is \$4.76 per short ton of coke, ranging from \$3.26 to \$7.69 per ton of coke. These costs vary by producer type, with merchant producers averaging \$5.53 per ton of coke versus captive producers who average \$4.42 per ton of coke.

**Table B-5. Other Costs by Producer Type: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	<b>Captive</b>	<b>Merchant</b>	<b>All Coke Batteries</b>
Number of batteries	40	18	58
Average	\$4.42	\$5.53	\$4.76
Minimum	\$3.27	\$3.26	\$3.26
Maximum	\$7.69	\$7.42	\$7.69

#### ***B.1.5 By- and Co-product Credits***

In addition to the variable cost inputs described above, by- and co-products are associated with the manufacture of coke products. Therefore, the Agency modified Eq. (B.1) by subtracting (1) revenues generated from the sale of by-/co-products and (2) credits associated with using of coke oven gas as an energy input in the production process. The following cost function adjustments were made to the engineering model to incorporate by- and co-products into the cokemaking cost function:

- Coke breeze—ICR survey responses provided coke breeze output per ton of coke for each battery.

- Other industrial coke—ICR survey responses provided other industrial coke output per ton of coke for each battery.
- Coke oven gas—Based on secondary sources and discussions with engineers, furnace coke producers were assumed to produce 8,500 ft<sup>3</sup> per ton of coal, and foundry producers were assumed to produce 11,700 ft<sup>3</sup> per ton of coal (Lankford et al., 1985; EPA, 1988).

As shown in Table B-6, the average by-/co-product credit is \$19.54 per ton of coke for captive producers and \$24.05 per ton of coke for merchant producers.

**Table B-6. By-/Co-Product Credits by Producer Type: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	Captive	Merchant	All Coke Batteries
Number of batteries	40	18	58
Average	\$19.54	\$24.05	\$20.94
Minimum	\$16.09	\$10.69	\$10.69
Maximum	\$35.99	\$51.78	\$51.78

## B.2 MACT/LAER Pollution Abatement Costs

The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments mandated two levels of control for emissions from coke ovens. The first control level, referred to as MACT, specified limits for leaking doors, lids, offtakes, and time of charge. This level of control was to be attained by 1995. The second level of control, Lowest Achievable Emissions Rate (LAER), specified more stringent limits for leaking doors and offtakes. Estimates of the MACT and LAER costs associated with these controls were developed for EPA's *Controlling Emissions from By-Product Coke Oven Charging, Door Leaks, and Topside Leaks: An Economic Impacts Analysis* (EPA, 1991).<sup>1</sup> Table B-7 provides summary statistics for the projected costs associated with each level of control. However, the Agency determined that industry actions undertaken in the interim period to comply with the MACT limits have enabled them to also meet the LAER limits. Therefore, only the MACT-related pollution abatement costs have

<sup>1</sup>The Agency estimated costs for the LAER control level using two scenarios. The first (LAER-MIN) assumed all batteries will require new doors and jambs. The second (LAER-MAX) also assumed all batteries will require new doors and jambs and in addition assumed batteries with the most serious door leak problems would be rebuilt. This analysis reports cost estimates for the LAER-MIN scenario.

**Table B-7. Pollution Abatement Costs by Producer Type: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	<b>Captive</b>	<b>Merchant</b>	<b>All Coke Batteries</b>
Number of batteries	40	18	58
MACT			
Average	\$0.83	\$2.34	\$1.30
Minimum	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Maximum	\$2.59	\$11.14	\$11.14
LAER			
Average	\$1.64	\$2.44	\$1.88
Minimum	\$0.07	\$0.94	\$0.07
Maximum	\$2.63	\$6.07	\$6.07

been incorporated to determine the appropriate baseline costs for the 2000 economic model. As shown in Table B-7, the average MACT pollution abatement cost across all coke batteries is \$1.30 per short ton of coke. The projected costs for captive producers range from zero to \$2.59 per ton of coke, while projected costs for merchant producers range from zero to \$11.14 per ton of coke.

### **B.3 Fixed Costs**

Production of coke requires the combination of variable inputs outlined above with fixed capital equipment (e.g., coke ovens and auxiliary equipment). It also includes other overhead and administrative expenses. For each coke battery, the average fixed costs per ton of coke can be obtained by dividing the total fixed costs (TFC) estimated by the coke model by total battery coke production. Therefore, the average fixed cost function (expressed in dollars per ton of coke) can be written as

$$AFC = (PTI + ASE + PYOH + PLOH)/Q \quad (B.2)$$

where

- property taxes and insurance (PTI) =  $(0.02) \cdot (\$225 \cdot \text{Coke Capacity})$ . This category accounts for the fixed costs associated with property taxes and insurance for the battery. The cost model estimates this component as 2 percent of capital cost. Capital costs are estimated to be \$225 per annual short ton of capacity based on reported estimates of capital investment cost of a rebuilt by-product coke-making facility (USITC, 1994). As shown in Table B-8, the average PTI cost across all batteries is \$4.47 per ton of coke.

**Table B-8. Average Fixed Costs by Producer Type: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	Captive	Merchant	All Coke Batteries
Number of batteries	40	18	58
Property taxes and insurance			
Average	\$4.41	\$4.58	\$4.47
Minimum	\$3.20	\$3.55	\$3.20
Maximum	\$6.78	\$6.11	\$6.78
Administrative and sales expense			
Average	\$4.96	\$5.16	\$5.02
Minimum	\$3.60	\$4.00	\$3.60
Maximum	\$7.63	\$6.87	\$7.63
Payroll overhead			
Average	\$3.44	\$5.79	\$4.17
Minimum	\$1.84	\$2.21	\$1.84
Maximum	\$7.67	\$8.93	\$8.93
Plant overhead			
Average	\$10.18	\$18.91	\$12.89
Minimum	\$5.73	\$7.92	\$5.73
Maximum	\$21.83	\$28.62	\$28.62

- administration and sales expense (ASE) =  $(0.02) \cdot (\$225 \cdot \text{Coke capacity})$ . This category accounts for the fixed costs associated with administrative and sales expenses for the coke battery. The cost model also calculates this component as 2 percent of capital cost. As shown in Table B-8, the average cost across all coke batteries for ASE is \$5.02 per ton of coke.
- payroll overhead (PYOH) =  $(0.2) \cdot (\text{Total labor costs})$ . Payroll overhead is modified as 20 percent of total labor costs. Payroll overhead is used to capture fringe benefits because wage rates obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics exclude fringe benefits. As shown in Table B-8, the average payroll overhead is \$3.44 per ton of coke for captive producers and \$5.79 per ton of coke for merchant producers, reflecting the different labor requirements by producer type.
- plant overhead (PLOH) =  $(0.5) \cdot (\text{Total payroll} + \text{Total other expenses})$ . The cost model computes plant overhead as 50 percent of total payroll and total other expenses by producer type. As shown in Table B-8, the average plant overhead cost is \$10.18 for captive producers and \$18.91 for merchant producers. As with

payroll overhead, this difference reflects differences in labor requirements for captive and merchant producers.

#### **B.4 Summary of Results**

Table B-9 summarizes each cost component and aggregates them to estimate the average total costs per ton of coke by producer type. As shown, the average total cost (ATC) across all coke batteries is \$98.49 per short ton of coke. The ATC for captive producers is \$92.62 per short ton of coke and is significantly lower than the ATC for merchant producers at \$111.52. This difference reflects both economies of scale and lower production costs associated with the production of furnace coke. These differences are also consistent with observed market prices for furnace coke \$112 (produced mainly by captive producers) and for foundry coke \$161 (produced solely by merchant producers with some furnace coke) (USITC, 2001b, 2001c). A correlation analysis of these cost estimates shows that ATC is negatively correlated with coke battery capacity (correlation coefficient of -0.70) and start/rebuild date (correlation coefficient of -0.63). Therefore, average total costs are lower for larger coke batteries and those that are new or recently rebuilt. Tables B-10 and B-11 present cost estimates for individual captive and merchant coke batteries, respectively.

#### **B.5 Nonrecovery Cokemaking**

Several substitute technologies for by-product cokemaking have been developed in the United States and abroad. In the United States, the nonrecovery method is the only substitute that has a significant share of the coke market. This technology is relatively new, and, as a result, the original coke production cost model did not include estimates for these types of coke-making batteries. The nonrecovery process is less costly than the by-product process because of the absence of recovery operations and a lower labor input requirement per ton of coke. Therefore, the Agency modified the model to reflect these cost advantages in the following manner:

- No expenses/credits associated with by- and co-product recovery.
- Reduced labor input—labor requirement estimates generated by the model were multiplied by a factor of 0.11, which represents the ratio of employment per ton of coke at merchant batteries to employment per ton of coke at nonrecovery batteries.

**Table B-9. Cost Summary by Producer Type: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	Captive	Merchant	All Coke Batteries
Number of batteries	40	18	58
Average variable cost <sup>a</sup>			
Average	\$68.80	\$74.74	\$70.64
Minimum	\$57.95	\$39.80	\$39.80
Maximum	\$82.94	\$91.00	\$91.00
MACT			
Average	\$0.83	\$2.34	\$1.30
Minimum	\$0.00	\$0.00	\$0.00
Maximum	\$2.59	\$11.14	\$11.14
Average fixed cost			
Average	\$22.99	\$34.44	\$26.55
Minimum	\$15.61	\$17.91	\$15.61
Maximum	\$43.91	\$48.34	\$48.34
Average total cost			
Average	\$92.62	\$111.52	\$98.49
Minimum	\$73.87	\$69.92	\$69.92
Maximum	\$127.07	\$141.84	\$141.84

<sup>a</sup>Includes by-/co-product credits.

- Exceed current standards of pollution abatement (*Engineering and Mining Journal*, 1997)—MACT compliance costs were excluded.

As shown in Table B-12, the ATC for nonrecovery coke-making facilities is \$69.25 per ton of coke, which is significantly lower than the average ATC of captive and merchant producers. These costs vary slightly across these batteries ranging from \$67.51 to \$70.12 per ton of coke. Table B-13 presents cost estimates for individual nonrecovery cokemaking batteries.

**Table B-10. Cost Data Summary for Captive Coke Batteries: 2000**

Facility Name	Location	Producer Type <sup>a</sup>	Coke Type <sup>b</sup>	Capacity (short tons/yr)	Start/ Rebuild Date	AVC <sup>c</sup> (\$/short ton)	MACT (\$/short ton)	AFC (\$/short ton)	ATC (\$/short ton)
Acme Steel	Chicago, IL	C	1	250,000	1979	\$74.41	\$1.02	\$20.69	\$96.13
Acme Steel	Chicago, IL	C	1	250,000	1978	\$74.26	\$1.02	\$20.69	\$95.97
AK Steel	Ashland, KY	C	1	634,000	1978	\$66.88	\$1.28	\$18.88	\$87.05
AK Steel	Ashland, KY	C	1	366,000	1953	\$69.25	\$1.02	\$21.15	\$91.42
AK Steel	Middletown, OH	C	1	429,901	1952	\$74.42	\$1.23	\$23.62	\$99.27
Bethlehem Steel	Burns Harbor, IN	C	1	948,000	1972	\$58.99	\$0.72	\$18.11	\$77.82
Bethlehem Steel	Burns Harbor, IN	C	1	929,000	1983	\$59.27	\$0.71	\$18.68	\$78.66
Bethlehem Steel	Lackawanna, NY	C	1	375,000	1962	\$65.66	\$1.78	\$21.41	\$88.86
Bethlehem Steel	Lackawanna, NY	C	1	375,000	1952	\$65.65	\$1.83	\$21.23	\$88.71
Geneva Steel	Provo, UT	C	1	200,000	1944	\$77.49	\$0.27	\$28.62	\$106.38
Geneva Steel	Provo, UT	C	1	200,000	1944	\$78.44	\$0.27	\$30.92	\$109.62
Geneva Steel	Provo, UT	C	1	200,000	1944	\$78.41	\$0.22	\$26.47	\$105.10
Geneva Steel	Provo, UT	C	1	200,000	1944	\$82.94	\$0.22	\$43.91	\$127.07
Gulf States Steel	Gadsden, AL	C	1	250,000	1942	\$75.28	\$1.71	\$27.56	\$104.55
Gulf States Steel	Gadsden, AL	C	1	250,000	1965	\$74.47	\$2.59	\$19.44	\$96.51
LTV Steel	Chicago, IL	C	1	615,000	1982	\$63.79	\$0.36	\$18.38	\$82.52
LTV Steel	Warren, OH	C	1	549,000	1979	\$69.00	\$0.04	\$22.18	\$91.22
National Steel	Ecorse, MI	C	1	924,839	1992	\$78.68	\$0.27	\$17.44	\$96.38
National Steel	Granite City, IL	C	1	300,931	1982	\$69.93	\$0.68	\$21.26	\$91.87
National Steel	Granite City, IL	C	1	300,931	1980	\$69.93	\$0.68	\$21.26	\$91.88

(continued)



**Table B-10. Cost Data Summary for Captive Coke Batteries: 2000 (continued)**

Facility Name	Location	Producer Type <sup>a</sup>	Coke Type <sup>b</sup>	Capacity (short tons/yr)	Start/ Rebuild Date	AVC <sup>c</sup> (\$/short ton)	MACT (\$/short ton)	AFC (\$/short ton)	ATC (\$/short ton)
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	844,610	1982	\$59.24	\$0.72	\$15.75	\$75.71
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	668,680	1976	\$60.62	\$0.00	\$20.32	\$80.94
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	668,680	1978	\$60.62	\$0.00	\$20.32	\$80.94
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	373,395	1989	\$63.33	\$0.00	\$21.71	\$85.03
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	373,395	1989	\$63.33	\$0.00	\$21.71	\$85.03
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	373,395	1979	\$63.33	\$1.04	\$21.71	\$86.07
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	378,505	1955	\$65.43	\$1.04	\$22.73	\$89.20
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	378,505	1955	\$65.43	\$1.09	\$22.73	\$89.25
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	378,505	1955	\$65.43	\$1.09	\$22.73	\$89.25
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	378,505	1954	\$66.39	\$1.09	\$22.46	\$89.94
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	378,505	1954	\$66.39	\$1.04	\$22.46	\$89.89
USX	Clairton, PA	C	1	378,505	1954	\$66.39	\$0.00	\$22.46	\$88.85
USX	Gary, IN	C	1	827,820	1976	\$65.47	\$0.65	\$23.24	\$89.36
USX	Gary, IN	C	1	827,820	1975	\$66.41	\$0.65	\$22.60	\$89.67
USX	Gary, IN	C	1	297,110	1954	\$72.99	\$1.51	\$24.76	\$99.26
USX	Gary, IN	C	1	297,110	1954	\$73.22	\$1.51	\$25.94	\$100.67
Wheeling-Pitt	Follansbee, WV	C	1	782,000	1977	\$57.95	\$0.31	\$15.61	\$73.87
Wheeling-Pitt	Follansbee, WV	C	1	163,000	1964	\$73.58	\$1.36	\$30.00	\$104.93
Wheeling-Pitt	Follansbee, WV	C	1	151,000	1955	\$74.69	\$1.11	\$29.28	\$105.07
Wheeling-Pitt	Follansbee, WV	C	1	151,000	1953	\$74.69	\$1.11	\$29.28	\$105.07

<sup>a</sup>C = Captive; M = Merchant.

<sup>b</sup>1 = Furnace; 2 = Foundry; 3 = Both.

**Table B-11. Cost Data Summary for Merchant Coke Batteries: 2000**

Facility Name	Location	Producer Type <sup>a</sup>	Coke Type <sup>b</sup>	Capacity (short tons/yr)	Start/Rebuild Date	AVC <sup>c</sup> (\$/short ton)	MACT (\$/short ton)	AFC (\$/short ton)	ATC (\$/short ton)
ABC Coke	Tarrant, AL	M	2	490,528	1968	\$66.46	\$1.22	\$17.91	\$85.59
ABC Coke	Tarrant, AL	M	3	112,477	1951	\$81.68	\$2.69	\$32.48	\$116.85
ABC Coke	Tarrant, AL	M	3	96,962	1941	\$86.10	\$2.56	\$36.12	\$124.78
Citizens Gas	Indianapolis, IN	M	3	389,116	1979	\$47.46	\$1.05	\$21.41	\$69.92
Citizens Gas	Indianapolis, IN	M	2	128,970	1946	\$79.85	\$2.02	\$43.85	\$125.72
Citizens Gas	Indianapolis, IN	M	2	116,845	1941	\$84.51	\$2.13	\$48.34	\$134.98
Empire Coke	Holt, AL	M	2	108,026	1978	\$88.52	\$7.38	\$38.11	\$134.01
Empire Coke	Holt, AL	M	2	54,013	1978	\$90.09	\$11.14	\$40.61	\$141.84
Erie Coke	Erie, PA	M	2	130,073	1943	\$73.99	\$1.73	\$46.76	\$122.48
Erie Coke	Erie, PA	M	2	84,878	1952	\$75.12	\$1.48	\$48.19	\$124.78
Koppers	Monessen, PA	M	1	245,815	1981	\$79.25	\$0.12	\$30.25	\$109.63
Koppers	Monessen, PA	M	1	126,766	1980	\$91.00	\$0.36	\$39.67	\$131.03
New Boston	Portsmouth, OH	M	1	346,126	1964	\$78.73	\$1.35	\$27.76	\$107.84
Shenango	Pittsburgh, PA	M	1	514,779	1983	\$78.87	\$0.00	\$28.29	\$107.16
Sloss Industries	Birmingham, AL	M	3	184,086	1959	\$44.32	\$1.61	\$25.59	\$71.52
Sloss Industries	Birmingham, AL	M	1	133,931	1952	\$79.78	\$1.61	\$30.30	\$111.69
Sloss Industries	Birmingham, AL	M	1	133,931	1956	\$79.78	\$1.61	\$30.30	\$111.69
Tonawanda	Buffalo, NY	M	2	268,964	1962	\$39.80	\$2.03	\$34.09	\$75.92

<sup>a</sup>C = Captive; M = Merchant.

<sup>b</sup>1 = Furnace; 2 = Foundry; 3 = Both.

**Table B-12. Cost Summary for Nonrecovery Coke Batteries: 2000 (\$/ton of coke)**

	Nonrecovery
Number of batteries	8
Metallurgical coal	
Average	\$47.58
Minimum	\$46.95
Maximum	\$48.21
Labor	
Average	\$2.07
Minimum	\$1.47
Maximum	\$2.68
Energy	
Average	\$6.45
Minimum	\$6.25
Maximum	\$6.71
Other	
Average	\$2.53
Minimum	\$2.44
Maximum	\$2.66
Average fixed cost	
Average	\$10.62
Minimum	\$10.07
Maximum	\$11.13
Average total cost	
Average	\$69.25
Minimum	\$67.51
Maximum	\$70.12

**Table B-13. Cost Data Summary for Nonrecovery Coke Batteries: 1997**

Facility Name	Location	Producer Type <sup>a</sup>	Coke Type <sup>b</sup>	Capacity (short tons/yr)	Start/Rebuild Date	AVC <sup>c</sup> (\$/short ton)	MACT (\$/short ton)	AFC (\$/short ton)	ATC (\$/short ton)
Jewell Coke and Coal	Vansant, VA	M	1	197,000	1966	\$58.59	\$0.00	\$9.90	\$68.49
Jewell Coke and Coal	Vansant, VA	M	1	164,000	1983	\$59.31	\$0.00	\$10.38	\$69.69
Jewell Coke and Coal	Vansant, VA	M	1	124,000	1989	\$59.98	\$0.00	\$10.85	\$70.83
Jewell Coke and Coal	Vansant, VA	M	1	164,000	1990	\$59.31	\$0.00	\$10.38	\$69.69
Indiana Harbor Coke Co	East Chicago, IN	M	1	325,000	1998	\$62.36	\$0.00	\$10.52	\$72.88
Indiana Harbor Coke Co	East Chicago, IN	M	1	325,000	1998	\$62.36	\$0.00	\$10.52	\$72.88
Indiana Harbor Coke Co	East Chicago, IN	M	1	325,000	1998	\$62.36	\$0.00	\$10.52	\$72.88
Indiana Harbor Coke Co	East Chicago, IN	M	1	325,000	1998	\$62.36	\$0.00	\$10.52	\$72.88

<sup>a</sup>C = Captive; M = Merchant.

<sup>b</sup>1 = Furnace; 2 = Foundry; 3 = Both.

<sup>c</sup>Includes by-/co-product credits.

## **APPENDIX C**

### **ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF THE DEMAND ELASTICITY FOR STEEL MILL PRODUCTS**

This appendix summarizes EPA's estimation of the demand elasticities for steel mill products. These estimates are based on national-level data from 1987 through 1997 as obtained from the AISI, U.S. Bureau of the Census, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and other government sources. The following sections summarize the econometric procedure and present the estimates of the demand elasticity for the following nine steel mill products:

- semi-finished products
- structural shapes and plates
- rails and track accessories
- bars
- tool steel
- pipe and tubing
- wire
- tin mill
- sheet and strip

#### **C.1 Econometric Model**

A partial equilibrium market supply/demand model is specified as a system of interdependent equations in which the price and output of a product are simultaneously determined by the interaction of producers and consumers in the market. In simultaneous equation models, where variables in one equation feed back into variables in other equations, the error terms are correlated with the endogenous variables (price and output). In this case, single-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of individual equations will lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. Thus, simultaneous estimation of this system to

obtain elasticity estimates requires that each equation be identified through the inclusion of exogenous variables to control for shifts in the supply and demand curves over time.

Exogenous variables influencing the demand for steel mill products include measures of economic activity such as U.S. gross national and domestic production and the value of construction activity, and the price of substitute products such as aluminum, plastics and other nonferrous materials and building materials like cement/concrete (typically proxied by the appropriate producer price indices). Exogenous variables influencing the level of supply include measures of the change in the costs of iron and steel production caused by changes in prices of key inputs like raw materials, fuel, and labor (typically proxied by the producer price index for iron ore, coke, metallurgical coal, as well as the average hourly earnings for the industry's production workers).

The supply/demand system for a particular steel mill product over time (t) is defined as follows:

$$Q_t^d = f(P_t, Z_t) + u_t \quad (C.1)$$

$$Q_t^s = g(P_t, W_t) + v_t \quad (C.2)$$

$$Q_t^d = Q_t^s \quad (C.3)$$

Eq. (C.1) shows quantity demanded in year t as a function of price,  $P_t$ , an array of demand factors,  $Z_t$  (e.g., measures of economic activity and substitute prices), and an error term,  $u_t$ . Eq. (C.2) represents quantity supplied in year t as a function of price and other supply factors,  $W_t$  (e.g., input prices), and an error term,  $v_t$ , while Eq. (C.3) specifies the equilibrium condition that quantity supplied equals quantity demanded in year t, creating a system of three equations in three variables. The interaction of the specified market forces solves this system, generating equilibrium values for the variables  $P_t^*$  and  $Q_t^* = Q_t^{d*} = Q_t^{s*}$ .

Since the objective is to generate estimates of the demand elasticities for use in the economic model, EPA employed the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression procedure to estimate only the parameters of the demand equation. This 2SLS approach is preferred to the three-stage least squares approach because the number of observations limits the degrees of freedom for use in the estimation procedure. EPA specified the logarithm of the quantity demanded as a linear function of the logarithm of the price so that the coefficient on the price variable yields the estimate of the constant elasticity of demand for steel mill product. All prices employed in the estimation process were deflated by the gross domestic product (GDP) implicit price deflator to reflect real rather than nominal prices. The first stage of the

2SLS procedure involves regressing the observed price against the supply and demand “shifter” variables that are exogenous to the system. This first stage produces fitted (or predicted) values for the price variable that are, by definition, highly correlated with the true endogenous variable, the observed price, and uncorrelated with the error term. In the second stage, these fitted values are then employed as observations of the right-hand side price variable in the demand function. This fitted value is uncorrelated with the error term by construction and thus does not incur the endogeneity bias.

## **C.2 Econometric Results**

Table C-1 provides the results of the econometric estimation for each steel mill product demand equation. The coefficients of the price variables represent the demand elasticity estimates for each of the nine steel mill products. As economic theory predicts, all of these estimates are negative, reflecting reductions in quantity demanded as price increases. The elasticities range from  $-0.16$  for semi-finished products to  $-2.17$  for rails and track accessories, with a shipments weighted average elasticity for all products of  $-0.59$ . As shown, three of the nine elasticity estimates are significant at a 90 percent confidence level.

As expected, the estimated coefficients for the demand growth variables (GDP and value of new construction) are all positive with the exception of the equation for steel wire drawn products. However, this estimate is not statistically significant. The regression coefficient results generally show that the price of aluminum, nonferrous metals’ producer price index (PPI), and plastics’ PPI are substitutes for the majority of the steel mill products. Prices increases for these products result in increases in quantity demand for steel mill products. The coefficient for the primary copper PPI is negative in the wire equation indicating that it is a complement. A price increase for this product decreases wire consumption. Copper and steel are both used in electric appliances; therefore, this is consistent with these results. The regressions also show a negative coefficient for the price of aluminum in the semi-finished products equation, the nonferrous metals’ PPI in the tin mill products equation, and the concrete products’ PPI in the structural shapes and plates equation suggesting these products are also complement products. Although these products may be substitutes in specific applications, they are often complement products in the production of final goods (i.e., building construction).

As a result of these econometric findings, the market model used the weighted average demand elasticity of  $-0.59$ .

**Table C-1. Two Stage Least Squares Regression Estimation of Steel Mill Products Demand Equations**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables (ln Q <sup>d</sup> )								
	Semi-finished Products	Structural Shapes and Plates	Rails and Track Accessories	Bars	Tool Steel	Pipe and Tubing	Wire	Tin Mill Products	Sheet and Strip
Constant	3.42 (1.47)	11.24 (1.93)	1.26 (0.27)	6.56 (1.71)	2.06 (0.31)	14.41 (1.11)	22.5 (1.14)	3.66 (0.61)	6.14 (0.61)
ln(price) <sup>a</sup>	-0.16 (-1.39)	-0.17 (-0.71)	-2.17 (-1.95)*	-0.66 (-1.17)	-0.47 (-2.02)*	-1.62 (-2.14)*	-0.73 (-2.05)	-0.28 (-1.61)	-0.65 (-1.90)
ln(gdp)	1.52 (4.64)***	1.20 (4.00)**	2.95 (4.96)***	1.61 (6.08)***	—	—	-1.13 (-0.55)	1.41 (2.32)*	1.92 (2.59)**
ln(value_new_construct)	—	—	—	—	0.98 (1.84)	0.13 (0.18)	—	—	—
ln(alum_price)	-0.20 (-2.75)**	—	0.08 (0.69)	0.27 (2.67)**	0.09 (0.52)	—	—	—	0.12 (1.18)
ln(PPI_nonfermetals)	—	0.69 (1.66)	—	—	—	—	—	-0.15 (-1.59)	—
ln(PPI_plast_parts_mfg)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.39 (1.23)	-0.26 (-0.29)
ln(PPI_plast_sh_rd_tube)	—	—	—	—	—	2.09 (0.90)	—	—	—
ln(PPI_copper_prim)	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.50 (-2.90)**	—	—
ln(PPI_conc_prod)	—	-1.59 (-1.25)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
ln(PPI_plast_prod)	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.78 (2.46)*	—	—
Time trend squared	—	—	—	—	—	—	-0.002 (-0.54)	-0.002 (-2.37)*	—

(continued)



**Table C-1. Two Stage Least Squares Regression Estimation of Steel Mill Products Demand Equations (Continued)**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables (ln Q <sup>d</sup> )								
	Semi-finished Products	Structural Shapes and Plates	Rails and Track Accessories	Bars	Tool Steel	Pipe and Tubing	Wire	Tin Mill Products	Sheet and Strip
R-Squared	0.90	0.81	0.82	0.84	0.44	0.51	0.98	0.57	0.93
Adjusted R-Squared	0.86	0.65	0.75	0.77	0.20	0.30	0.96	0.14	0.88
F value	21.44***	5.26**	10.87***	12.32***	1.85	2.41	42.23***	1.31	17.47***
Observations	11	10	11	11	11	11	10	11	10
Degrees of Freedom	7	5	7	7	7	7	4	5	5

Note: T-statistics of parameter estimates are in parenthesis. The F test analyzes the usefulness of the model. Asterisks indicate significance levels for these tests as follows:

\* = 90%, \*\* = 95%, \*\*\* = 99%

<sup>a</sup>Price of corresponding steel mill product.

Variable Descriptions:

ln(gdp)	real gross domestic product
ln(value_new_construct)	real value of construction put in place
ln(alum_price)	real price of aluminum
ln(PPI_nonfermetals)	real producer price index for nonferrous metals
ln(PPI_plast_parts_mfg)	real producer price index for plastic parts and components for manufacturing
ln(PPI_plast_sh_rd_tube)	real producer price index for laminated plastic sheets, rods, and tubes
ln(PPI_copper_prim)	real producer price index for primary copper
ln(PPI_conc_prod)	real producer price index for concrete products
ln(PPI_plast_prod)	real producer price index for plastic products
time trend squared	time trend squared

## **APPENDIX D**

### **ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION OF THE DEMAND ELASTICITY FOR IRON CASTINGS**

In this appendix, we summarize the econometric procedure used to estimate demand elasticities and present demand elasticity estimates for iron castings. Elasticity estimates are based on national-level annual sales and price data. In addition, individual demand elasticity estimates are developed for three subcategories of iron castings:

- Gray iron castings
- Ductile iron castings
- Malleable iron castings

#### **D.1 Econometric Model**

A partial equilibrium market supply/demand model is used to simulate the interaction of producers and consumers in the iron and steel casting markets. The model consists of a system of interdependent equations in which the price and output of a product are simultaneously determined. This class of model is referred to as a simultaneous equation model.

In simultaneous equation models, where variables in one equation feed back into variables in another equation, the error terms in each equation are correlated with the endogenous variables (price and output). In this case, single-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of individual equations will lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.

We therefore use a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach to correct for the correlation between the error term and the endogenous variables. The 2SLS approach requires that each equation be identified through the inclusion of exogenous variables to control for shifts in the supply and demand curves over time.

Exogenous variables influencing the demand for iron castings include measures of economic activity such as U.S. gross domestic production, the number of motor vehicle

sales, and the price of substitute products such as plastics, nonferrous castings and forgings, and steel mill products (typically proxied by the appropriate producer price indices). Exogenous variables influencing the level of supply include measures of the change in the costs of iron and steel castings production caused by changes in prices of key inputs such as raw materials, fuel, and labor (typically proxied by the producer price index for iron ore, coke, fuel, and electricity as well as the average hourly earnings for the industry's production workers).

The supply/demand system for a particular iron or steel casting over time (t) is defined as follows:

$$Q_t^d = f(P_t, Z_t) + u_t \quad (D.1)$$

$$Q_t^s = g(P_t, W_t) + v_t \quad (D.2)$$

$$Q_t^d = Q_t^s \quad (D.3)$$

Eq. (D.1) represents quantity demanded,  $Q_t^d$  in year t as a function of price,  $P_t$ , and other demand factors,  $Z_t$  (e.g., measures of economic activity and prices of substitute products), and an error term,  $u_t$ . Equation D.2 represents quantity supplied,  $Q_t^s$ , in year t as a function of price and other supply factors,  $W_t$  (e.g., wage rate and other input prices), and an error term,  $v_t$ . Eq. (D.3) specifies the equilibrium condition, where quantity supplied equals quantity demanded in year t. Equation D.3 creates a system of three equations in three variables. Solving the system generates equilibrium values for the variables  $P_t^*$  and  $Q_t^* = Q_t^{d*} = Q_t^{s*}$ .

We use a 2SLS regression procedure to estimate the parameters and obtain the demand elasticities.<sup>1</sup> In the first stage of the 2SLS procedure, the observed price is regressed against the supply and demand “shifter” variables that are exogenous to the system. The first stage produces fitted (or imputed) values for the price variable that are, by definition, highly correlated with the true endogenous variable (the observed price) and uncorrelated with the error term. In the second stage, these fitted values are then employed as explanatory variables of the right-hand side in the demand function. The imputed value is uncorrelated with the error term by construction and thus does not incur the endogeneity bias.

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<sup>1</sup>The 2SLS approach was selected over the three-stage least squares (3SLS) approach because of the limited number of observations available for the regression analysis. The 3SLS approach requires more degrees of freedom for the estimation procedure.

The logarithm of the quantity demanded is modeled as a linear function of the logarithm of the commodity price. This specification enables us to interpret the price variable coefficient as a constant elasticity of demand.

## **D.2 Econometric Results**

Demand elasticities for iron castings—and for the subcategories gray, ductile, and malleable iron castings—are estimated based on commodity data from the U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, and other government sources. The average prices for iron and steel commodities are calculated based on value of shipments data from 1987 through 1997. Prior to estimating demand elasticities, all prices are deflated by the gross domestic product (GDP) implicit price deflator to reflect real rather than nominal prices.

Table D-1 provides demand elasticity estimates for iron castings. The coefficients on the price variables,  $\ln(\text{price})$ , are the estimates of the demand elasticity. Demand elasticity reflects how responsive consumers are to changes in the price of a product. For normal goods, consumption decreases as price increases, and this negative relationship is shown by a negative price variable coefficient. As economic theory predicts, our estimated coefficients on the price variables are negative.

As shown in Table D-1, all of the individual elasticity estimates are inelastic, implying that a 1 percent increase in price results in a less than 1 percent decrease in consumption. Individual demand elasticity estimates for the iron casting subcategories range from  $-0.41$  for malleable iron castings to  $-0.67$  for gray iron castings. As shown in Table D-1, the econometrically determined demand elasticity for all iron castings was  $-0.58$ .

The estimated coefficients for the demand growth variables (GDP and motor vehicle production volume) are all positive, with the coefficient for steel castings significant at the 95 percent level and the coefficient for iron castings significant at the 99 percent level. The coefficients for plastic manufacturing parts and steel pipe and tube products are negative in the ductile iron castings equation indicating that these are complements. Price increases for these products are therefore expected to decrease consumption of ductile iron castings. However, neither of these coefficients is significant at the 90 percent confidence level.

**Table D-1. Two Stage Least Squares Regression Estimation of Iron and Steel Castings Demand Equations**

Independent Variables	Dependent Variables			
	Iron Castings			All Iron
	Gray Iron	Ductile Iron	Malleable Iron	
Constant	.81 (.43)	.82 (.20)	-3.12 (-1.04)	-42.90 (-8.15)***
ln(price)	-.67 (-2.80)**	-.42 (-1.89)*	-.41 (-1.51)	-.58 (-2.52)**
ln(gdpd)	—	—	—	5.17 (11.10)***
ln(motor)	.91 (9.97)***	1.01 (4.62)***	.61 (3.79)***	—
ln(PPI_plast_parts_trans)	.09 (.26)	—	—	—
ln(PPI_nonferr_forge)	.50 (1.37)	—	.04 (.07)	-2.57 (-6.33)***
ln(PPI_nonferr_foundry)	—	1.83 (1.88)*	—	—
ln(PPI_plast_parts_mfg)	—	-.90 (-1.22)	1.07 (3.48)***	4.58 (7.97)***
ln(pipe_price) <sup>a</sup>	.16 (.76)	-.57 (-.95)	.14 (.41)	.23 (.95)
R-Squared	.97	.92	.89	.97
Adjusted R-Squared	.94	.87	.81	.94
F Value	33.90***	17.08***	11.49***	38.46***
Observations	12	13	13	12
Degrees of Freedom	5	5	5	5

Note: T-statistics of parameter estimates are in parentheses. The F test analyzes the usefulness of the model. Asterisks indicate significance levels for these tests as follows: \* = 90%, \*\* = 95%, \*\*\* = 99%

<sup>a</sup>Price of corresponding casting.

Variable Descriptions:

ln(gdp)	real gross domestic product	ln(PPI_nonferr_forge)	real producer price index for nonferrous metal forge shop products
ln(motor)	U.S. motor vehicle production	ln(PPI_plast_parts_mfg)	real producer price index for parts and components for manufacturing
ln(PPI_plast_parts_trans)	real producer price index for plastic parts for transportation	ln(pipe_price)	real producer of steel mill pipe and tube products
		ln(PPI_nonferr_foundry)	real producer price index for nonferrous foundry shop products

### **D.3 Summary**

Based on the econometric findings, we use the following demand elasticity estimate for iron castings in the market model:

- Iron castings =  $-0.58$  (significant at the 95 percent level).

This value is similar to the 1997 production weighted average of the individual product elasticity estimates presented in Table D-1 ( $-0.52$ ).

## **APPENDIX E**

### **JOINT ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE INTEGRATED IRON AND STEEL MACT STANDARD WITH THE COKE MACT STANDARD**

For this analysis, the Agency also considered the national-level economic impacts of joint implementation of the integrated iron and steel MACT standard with the coke MACT standard. The measures of economic impacts presented in this appendix are the result of incorporating the costs of compliance for each affected integrated iron and steel mill under the integrated iron and steel MACT into market models developed by the Agency to analyze the economic impacts of the coke MACT standard. The engineering analysis estimates annual costs for existing sources are \$15.5 million under the integrated iron and steel MACT and \$20.1 million under the coke MACT. Therefore, the total national estimate for existing sources under joint implementation are \$35.6 million.

#### **E.1 Market-Level Impacts**

The increased cost of coke production due to the regulation is expected to increase the price of furnace coke and steel mill products and reduce their production and consumption from 2000 baseline levels. As shown in Table E-1, the regulation is projected to increase the price of furnace coke by 2.9 percent, or \$3.26 per short ton. The increased captive production costs and higher market price associated with furnace coke are projected to increase steel mill product prices by less than 0.1 percent, or \$0.19 per ton. As expected, directly affected output declines across all producers, while supply from domestic and foreign producers not subject to the regulation increases. Although the results show net declines across all products (i.e., less than 1 percent decline in market output) the change in domestic production is typically higher. This is especially true for furnace coke where domestic production declines by 4.5 percent.

In contrast, the regulation showed no impact on price or quantity in the foundry coke market. This is due to the capacity constraints on domestic producers and the role of foreign imports. The supply of foundry coke is characterized by a domestic step supply function augmented by foreign supply, with foreign suppliers being the high cost producers in the market. Because foreign suppliers are the high cost producers, they determine the market

**Table E-1. Market-Level Impacts of the Joint Implementation of the Integrated Iron and Steel MACT and Coke MACT: 2000**

	Baseline	Changes From Baseline	
		Absolute	Percent
Furnace Coke			
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$112.00	\$3.26	2.91%
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	12,004	−120.9	−1.01%
Domestic production <sup>a</sup>	8,904	−399.7	−4.49%
Imports	3,100	278.8	8.99%
Foundry Coke			
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$161.00	—	0.00%
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	1,385	0.0	0.00%
Domestic production	1,238	0.0	0.00%
Imports	147	0.0	0.00%
Steel Mill Products			
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$489.45	\$0.19	0.04%
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	147,007	−36.1	−0.02%
Domestic production	109,050	−262.3	−0.24%
Integrated producers	57,153	−334.3	−0.58%
Nonintegrated steel mills <sup>b</sup>	51,897	72.0	0.14%
Imports	37,957	226.3	0.60%
Iron Castings			
Market price (\$/short ton)	\$1,028.50	\$0.00	0.00%
Market output (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	8,793	0.0	0.00%
Domestic production <sup>a</sup>	8,692	0.0	0.00%
Cupola furnaces	5,210	0.0	0.00%
Electric furnaces <sup>c</sup>	3,482	0.0	0.00%
Imports	101	0.0	0.00%

<sup>a</sup> Includes minimills.

<sup>b</sup> Excludes captive production.

<sup>c</sup> Includes electric arc or electric induction furnaces.



price and an upward shift in the domestic supply curve does not affect the equilibrium price or quantity. This implies that domestic foundry coke producers are not able to pass along any of the cost of the regulation. In addition, because there is no price change in the foundry coke market, the production of iron castings is unaffected by the regulation.

## **E.2 Industry-Level Impacts**

Industry revenue, costs, and profitability change as prices and production levels adjust to increased production costs. As shown in Table E-2, the economic model projects that profits for directly affected integrated iron and steel producers will decrease by \$36 million, or 4.9 percent. However, because the price increase exceeds the average cost increase, industry-level profits for U.S. merchant furnace coke producers are expected to increase by \$11.0 million, or 9.0 percent. In contrast, industry-level profits for U.S. merchant foundry coke producers are expected to decline by \$5.0 million, or 5.0 percent. These producers cannot pass along any of the control costs of the regulation because there is no price increase. Those domestic suppliers not subject to the regulation experience windfall gains with non-integrated steel mills (i.e., minimills) increasing profits by \$10 million.

### ***E.2.1 Changes in Profitability***

For integrated steel mills, operating profits decline by \$36 million. This is the net result of three effects:

- Net decrease in revenue (\$139 million): Steel mill product revenue decreases as a result of reductions in output. However, these losses were mitigated by increased revenues from furnace coke supplied to the market as a result of higher prices.
- Net decrease in production costs (\$128 million): Reduction in steel mill and market coke production costs occur as output declines. However, producers also experience increases in costs associated with the higher price of inputs (i.e., furnace coke).
- Increase in control costs (\$25 million): The costs of captive production of furnace coke increase as a result of regulatory controls.

Industry-wide profits for merchant furnace coke producers increase by \$10 million as a result of the following:

- Decreases in revenue (\$34 million): Reductions in output outweigh revenue increases as a result of higher market prices.

**Table E-2. National-Level Industry Impacts of the Joint Implementation of the Integrated Iron and Steel MACT and Coke MACT: 2000**

	Baseline	Changes From Baseline	
		Absolute	Percent
Integrated Iron and Steel Mills			
Total revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$28,430.5	−\$138.87	−0.49%
Steel mill products	\$27,973.6	−\$152.62	−0.55%
Market coke operations	\$456.9	\$13.75	3.01%
Total costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$27,690.8	−\$102.49	−0.37%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$25.29	NA
Steel production	\$0.0	\$15.39	NA
Captive coke production	\$0.0	\$7.42	NA
Market coke production	\$0.0	\$2.49	NA
Production costs	\$27,690.8	−\$127.78	−0.46
Steel production	\$25,327.3	−\$151.06	−0.60%
Captive coke production	\$746.6	−\$0.20	−0.03%
Market coke consumption	\$1,249.5	\$23.28	1.86%
Market coke production	\$367.4	\$0.20	0.05%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$739.7	−\$36.39	−4.92%
Iron and steel facilities (#)	20	0	0.00%
Coke batteries (#)	37	0	0.00%
Employment (FTEs)	66,603	−455	−0.68%
Coke Producers (Merchant Only)			
Furnace			
Revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$521.8	−\$33.88	−6.49%
Costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$404.5	−\$44.65	−11.04%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$2.95	NA
Production costs	\$404.5	−\$47.60	−11.77%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$117.4	\$10.78	9.18%
Coke batteries (#)	17	−3	−17.65%
Employment (FTEs)	774	−236	−30.49%
Foundry			
Revenues (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$245.5	\$0.61	0.25%
Costs (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$148.7	\$5.54	3.73%
Control costs	\$0.0	\$5.54	NA
Production costs	\$148.7	\$0.00	0.00%
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$96.8	−\$4.93	−5.10%
Coke batteries (#)	12	0	0.00%
Employment (FTEs)	2,486	0	0.00%

(continued)

**Table E-2. National-Level Industry Impacts of the Joint Implementation of the Integrated Iron and Steel MACT and Coke MACT: 2000 (continued)**

	Baseline	Changes From Baseline	
		Absolute	Percent
Nonintegrated Steel Mills <sup>a</sup>			
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	NA	\$10.1	NA
Cupola Furnaces			
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	NA	\$0.00	NA
Captive	NA	\$0.00	NA
Merchant	NA	\$0.00	NA
Affected	NA	\$0.00	NA
Unaffected	NA	\$0.00	NA
Electric Furnaces <sup>b</sup>			
Operating profits (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	NA	\$0.00	NA
Captive	NA	\$0.00	NA
Merchant	NA	\$0.00	NA
Affected	NA	\$0.00	NA
Unaffected	NA	\$0.00	NA

<sup>a</sup> Includes minimills.

<sup>b</sup> Includes iron foundries that use electric arc or electric induction furnaces.

- Reduction in production costs (\$48 million): Reduction in coke production costs occurs as output declines.
- Increased control costs (\$3 million): The cost of producing furnace coke increases as a result of regulatory controls.

Industry-wide profits for merchant foundry coke producers fall by \$5 million under the regulation:

- Increase in revenue (\$0.6 million): Given that we project no price changes for foundry coke, foundry coke revenue remains unchanged. However, small revenue increases occur for batteries that also produce small amounts of furnace coke.
- Reduction in production costs (\$0 million): No change in coke production costs occur as output remains unchanged.
- Increased control costs (\$5.6 million): The cost of producing foundry coke increases as a result of regulatory controls.

Lastly, domestic producers that are not subject to the regulation benefit from higher prices without additional control costs. As mentioned above, profits increase are projected for nonintegrated steel mills.

Additional distributional impacts of the rule within each producer segment are not necessarily apparent from the reported decline or increase in their aggregate operating profits. The regulation creates both gainers and losers within each industry segment based on the distribution of compliance costs across facilities. As shown in Table E-3, a substantial subset of the merchant coke facilities are projected to experience profit increases (i.e., 13 furnace coke batteries and 1 foundry coke battery that also produces furnace coke, or 62 percent). However, two merchant batteries are projected to cease market operations as they are the highest-cost coke batteries with the additional regulatory costs.

A majority of directly affected integrated iron and steel facilities (i.e., 16 plants, or 80 percent) are projected to become less profitable with the regulation with a total loss of \$49 million. However, four integrated mills are projected to benefit from higher coke prices and experience a total profit gain of \$13 million. These mills typically own furnace coke batteries with low production costs and lower per-unit compliance costs. In addition, a high proportion of their coke inputs are supplied internally.

### ***E.2.2 Facility Closures***

EPA estimates three merchant batteries supplying furnace coke are likely to prematurely close as a result of the regulation. In this case, these batteries are the highest-cost producers of furnace coke with the regulation.

### ***E.2.3 Changes in Employment***

As a result of decreased output levels, industry employment is projected to decrease by less than 1 percent, or 691 full-time equivalents (FTEs), with the regulation. This is the net result of employment losses for integrated iron and steel mills totaling 455 FTEs and merchant coke plants of 236 FTEs. Although EPA projects increases in output for producers not subject to the rule, which would likely lead to increases in employment, the Agency did not develop quantitative estimates for this analysis.

## **E.3 Social Cost**

The social impact of a regulatory action is traditionally measured by the change in economic welfare that it generates. The social costs of the final rule will be distributed across consumers and producers alike. Consumers experience welfare impacts due to

**Table E-3. Distribution Impacts of the Joint Implementation of the Integrated Iron and Steel MACT and Coke MACT Across Directly Affected Producers: 2000**

	With Regulation			Total
	Increased Profits	Decreased Profits	Closure	
Integrated Iron and Steel Mills				
Facilities (#)	4	16	0	20
Steel production				
Total (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	6,232	50,922	0	57,153
Average (tons/facility)	1,558	3,183	0	2,858
Steel compliance costs				
Total (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$0.08	\$15.46	\$0.00	\$15.54
Average (\$/ton)	\$0.01	\$0.30	\$0.00	\$0.27
Coke production				
Total (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	5,729	6,915	0	12,644
Average (tons/facility)	1,432	432	0	632
Coke compliance costs				
Total (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$0.17	\$9.74	\$0.00	\$9.91
Average (\$/ton)	\$0.03	\$1.41	\$0.00	\$0.78
Change in operating profit (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$12.62	−\$49.01	\$0.00	−\$36.39
Coke Plants (Merchant Only)				
Furnace				
Batteries (#)	13	1	3	17
Production (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)				
Total (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	3,979	255	404	4,637
Average (tons/facility)	306	255	135	273
Compliance costs				
Total (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$2.1	\$0.9	\$1.791	\$4.738
Average (\$/ton)	\$0.52	\$3.48	\$4.44	\$1.02
Change in operating profit (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$10.92	−\$0.06	−\$0.08	\$10.78
Foundry				
Batteries (#)	1	11	0	12
Production				
Total (10 <sup>3</sup> tpy)	476	1,181	0	1,657
Average (tons/facility)	476	107	0	138
Compliance costs				
Total (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$0.021	\$5.524	\$0.00	\$5.545
Average	\$0.04	\$4.68	\$0.00	\$3.35
Change in operating profit (\$10 <sup>6</sup> /yr)	\$0.59	−\$5.52	\$0.00	−\$4.93

changes in market prices and consumption levels associated with the rule. Producers experience welfare impacts resulting from changes in profits corresponding with the changes in production levels and market prices. However, it is important to emphasize that this measure does not include benefits that occur outside the market, that is, the value of reduced levels of air pollution with the regulation.

The national compliance cost estimates are often used as an approximation of the social cost of the rule. The engineering analysis estimated annual costs of \$35.6 million. In this case, the burden of the regulation falls solely on the affected facilities that experience a profit loss exactly equal to these cost estimates. Thus, the entire loss is a change in producer surplus with no change (by assumption) in consumer surplus. This is typically referred to as a “full-cost absorption” scenario in which all factors of production are assumed to be fixed and firms are unable to adjust their output levels when faced with additional costs.

In contrast, the economic analysis accounts for behavioral responses by producers and consumers to the regulation (i.e., shifting costs to other economic agents). This approach results in a social cost estimate that differs from the engineering estimate and also provides insights on how the regulatory burden is distributed across stakeholders. As shown in Table E-4, the economic model estimates the total social cost of the rule to be \$34 million. This difference occurs because society reallocates resources as a result of the increased cost of coke production.

In the final product markets, higher market prices lead to consumers of steel mill products experiencing losses of \$28.5 million. Although integrated iron and steel producers are able to pass on a limited amount of cost increases to their final consumers, e.g., automotive manufactures and construction industry, the increased costs result in a net decline in profits at integrated mills of \$36.4 million.

In the coke industry, low-cost merchant producers of furnace coke benefit at the expense of consumers and higher-cost coke batteries resulting in an industry-wide increase in profits. Furnace coke profits at merchant plants increase in aggregate by \$10.8 million. In contrast, foundry coke profits at merchant plants declines in aggregate by \$5 million.

Lastly, domestic producers not subject to the regulation (i.e., nonintegrated steel mills and electric furnaces) as well as foreign producers experience unambiguous gains because they benefit from increases in market price under both alternatives.

**Table E-4. Distribution of the Social Costs of the Joint Implementation of the Integrated Iron and Steel MACT and Coke MACT: 2000**

<b>Change in Consumer Surplus (\$10<sup>6</sup>/yr)</b>	<b>–\$28.52</b>
Steel mill product consumers	–\$28.52
Domestic	–\$27.25
Foreign	–\$1.27
Iron casting consumers	\$0.00
Domestic	\$0.00
Foreign	\$0.00
<b>Change in Producer Surplus (\$10<sup>6</sup>/yr)</b>	<b>\$5.27</b>
Domestic producers	–\$20.47
Integrated iron and steel mills	–\$36.39
Nonintegrated steel mills <sup>a</sup>	\$10.07
Cupola furnaces	\$0.00
Electric furnaces <sup>b</sup>	\$0.00
Furnace coke (merchant only)	\$10.78
Foundry coke (merchant only)	–\$4.93
Foreign producers	\$15.20
Iron and steel	\$4.63
Castings	\$0.00
Furnace coke	\$10.57
Foundry coke	\$0.00
<b>Change In Total Social Surplus<sup>c</sup> (\$10<sup>6</sup>/yr)</b>	<b>–\$33.79</b>

<sup>a</sup> Includes minimills.

<sup>b</sup> Includes electric arc or electric induction furnaces.

<sup>c</sup> The negative change in total social surplus indicates that the social cost of the regulation is \$33.79 million.

## APPENDIX F

### FOREIGN IMPORTS SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS

The purpose of this appendix is to investigate the sensitivity of economic impact estimates to changes in the blast furnace coke import supply elasticity parameter. To model imports, we used a simple constant elasticity functional form to develop a supply curve for a single foreign supplier. Graham, Thorpe, and Hogan (1999) use values of 3 and 10 in their simulation analysis although they consider a value of 3 as being the most likely (page 204). Therefore, the Agency used a value of 3 for the base case scenario. However, we conducted additional sensitivity analysis for the foreign supply elasticity using an even more elastic value of 10.

#### F.1 Sensitivity Analysis Results

As shown in Table F-1, the market price increase falls from 2.7 to 1.1 percent and the change in domestic market output increases from –3.9 percent to –4.5 percent, an additional decrease of 51,000 short tons. In addition, one additional furnace coke battery is projected to close. Foreign imports increase from 8.3 percent to 11.4 percent under this elasticity assumption.

**Table F-1. Market-Level Impacts of the Final Coke MACT: 2000**

	Imports $\xi = 3.0$	Imports $\xi = 10$
<b>Furnace Coke</b>		
Market price (percent change)	2.7%	1.1%
Market output (percent change)	–0.8%	–0.4%
Domestic production	–3.9%	–4.5%
Imports	8.3%	11.4%
Closures (# batteries)	2	3



In contrast the shows no market impact differences on price or quantity in the foundry coke market. As discussed in Section 4, this is due to the capacity constraints on domestic producers and the role of foreign imports. The supply of foundry coke is characterized by a domestic step supply function augmented by foreign supply, with foreign suppliers being the high cost producers in the market. Because foreign suppliers are the high cost producers, they determine the market price and an upward shift in the domestic supply curve does not affect the equilibrium price or quantity. This implies that domestic foundry coke producers are not able to pass along any of the cost of the regulation. In addition, because there is no price change in the foundry coke market, the production of iron castings is unaffected by the regulation.

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